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Pregnancy Discrimination and Social Change:
Evolving Consciousness About a Worker's Right to
Job-Protected, Paid Leave
t
Patricia A. Shiu and Stephanie M. Wildmantt

ABSTRACT: This Article examines the change over the past few decades in
U.S. law and societal attitudes concerning a worker's right to job-protected,
paid leave. Though common around the world, job-protected, paid leave eludes
the U.S. workforce. The authors begin by considering the concept of work, its
relation to identity, and the construction of safety nets for workers when they
need income replacement. The Article considers the movement to establish job
protected, paid leave that encompasses and values a worker's work, family, and
personal life.
The modern movement originated with pregnant workers' need for time
away from work during pregnancy. Women who believed that employer
policies had discriminated against them on account of pregnancy did not fare
well in early cases. As a response Congress enacted the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA) in 1 978, amending Title VII of the 1 964 Civil
Rights Act and defining discrimination on account of pregnancy as prohibited
sex discrimination. This amendment set the stage for California Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra and a debate on the meaning of equality
for women in the workplace. Lillian Garland's pregnancy served as the catalyst
for this debate which fueled a long-term California coalition. The Article
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discusses the legislative efforts in California over the last thirty years to expand
workplace protections, accommodations, and benefits. It concludes by
reflecting on social change through the lens of this movement to provide a
coherent and comprehensive safety net for all workers.
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INTRODUCTION

Commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the Pregnancy Discrimination
l
Act (PDA), this Article reflects upon the movement to establish a worker's
right to job�protected, paid leave. Although common around the world, job
protected, paid leave remains an unachieved goal for the U.S. workforce.
Awareness of the leave issue originated in the context of a pregnant worker's
need for time away from work during pregnancy and birth. Yet in a truly
inclusive, equitable, humane, and global workplace, job-protected, paid leave
2
would include not only parents but also siblings, grandparents, and others as
the caregivers covered within its protective ambit. Such a leave would provide
full income protection. Finally, an ideal job�protected, paid leave would
I. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e(k) (2009).
2. See E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-marital
Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REv. 1 063, 1 064 ( 1 999) (discussing how facially-neutral laws serve an expressive
function demonstrating the state's disfavor for same-sex committed partnerships by denying such
partnerships public and private benefits). See generally San Francisco Sick Leave Ordinance, S.F.
ADMIN. CODE § 12W, available at http://www.municode.com/contentl420 1 /J4 1 3 1 /HTMLlchOJ2w.html
(enacted by voter-approved Proposition F on Nov. 7, 2006, effective Feb. 5, 2007) (requiring all
employers to provide sick leave to employees who work in San Francisco and allowing employees to
use paid sick leave to care for a designated person who is not a spouse or registered domestic partner).
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provide not only time off from work for family-related reasons, but also time
away from the job for the pursuit of other life endeavors such as education, rest,
or rejuvenation that would make a worker more productive. These workplace
protections remain long-term aspirations. Currently and for the purposes of this
Article, the phrase "job-protected, paid leave" refers to time away from work
during pregnancy or to care for one's own serious health condition or the
serious health condition of a family member.3 The phrase also includes time
taken to bond with a newborn, adopted, or foster child.
The passage of the PDA in 1978 helped raise public awareness about the
need for job-protected, paid leave and pushed the legislators and judges who
function within the realm of existing culture to imagine a pregnant worker who
4
needed basic workplace protection. But the language of the PDA left the
content of that protection amorphously defined in the public eye as "equality."
S
Equality of rights remains a powerful tenet in the U.S. judicial system, yet the
notion of equality alone does not define the parameters for workplace
protection.6 This Article explores the interactions of law, culture, and
pregnancy with the struggle over the meaning of equality. It also traces the
post-PDA movement that sought to raise public consciousness about workers'
need for job-protected, paid leave, as it took incremental steps toward
achieving this basic job protection.
In California that movement sought to help all workers who were grappling
with the competing demands of work and family by expanding rights to
workplace accommodations and benefits. In devising a strategy for promoting
paid leave, this California movement was cognizant of clients' needs for
workplace accommodations, which dictated choices about legislative policy
and informed litigation strategies.7 The wide acceptance of paid leaves
internationally spurred the California movement's realization of just how far
the United States lagged behind other countries that provide a host of health
care and child-care benefits, workplace accommodations, and job protections.8

3. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k} (2009); 29 C.F.R. § 825.308 (2008).
4. See generally Sharon K. Hom & Eric K. Yamamoto, Collective Memory, History, and Social
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1 747 (2000) (describing the framing of injustice "in the law's eye and the
public's mind").
5. Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation ofSex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme
Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REv. 265-66 ( 1 9ll4).
6. See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 596 ( 1 982)
(arguing that equality is a bankrupt idea, devoid of content).
7. The Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center (LAS-ELC) in San Francisco traditionally has
emphasized client-driven policies and litigation. See infra Part III discussing Cal. Fed. and the LAS
ELC representation of Lillian Garland.
8. Brief for Human Rights Advocates et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6, Cal. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 ( 1987) (No. 85-494) ("[Olver 1 27 nations around the world
and many international treaties provide protection for pregnant working women, analogous to the
protection afforded by the California statute here at issue.").
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These workplace policies and benefits were and are common in Europe and
other countries and would greatly benefit American workers and families. 9
Part I of the Article places the movement for job-protected, paid leave in
the societal context of attitudes about work, welfare, and identity. Everyone
needs some form of subsistence to survive. For those in the workforce, income
provides that source of survival. For those without work, government income
supplement programs have provided the safety net to meet human needs, but
such programs have not provided the identity and inclusion in society provided
by work. Part II consiqers two different responses to the Supreme Court's
ruling in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,IO which held that differential
treatment based on a pregnancy-related condition did not constitute sex
discrimination under Title VII of the 1 964 Civil Rights Act. It contrasts the
federal response, as exemplified by Congress's amendment to Title VII,
enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),II with the response of the
California State Legislature, which enacted an unpaid, job-protected, pregnancy
disability le�ve. 12 Part III revisits the struggles of Lillian Garland, one of the
heroines of this movement, and her role in California Federal Savings & Loan
13
v. Guerra (Cal. Fed.), which concerned her right to give birth to her child and
keep her job. Part IV reconsiders the debate that Garland's case brought to the
forefront in the feminist legal community about the meaning of workplace
equality. Part V considers the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Cal. Fed. , and
Part VI examines the post Cal Fed. movement in California to establish
expanded workplace leaves and accommodation. This movement included
extending protection to siblings and grandparents and establishing paid sick
leave under California law. The Article concludes with reflections on lessons
learned about social change.
-

.

9. See generally Saul Levmore, Parental Leave and American Exceptionalism, 58 CASE W. REs. L.
203, 203-04 (2007) (characterizing the American approach to parental leave as "exceptionalism"
because it is so drastically different from leave policies in other nations and is "one of the least generous
parental leave policies in the world").
However, not every country provides progressive workplace protections and accommodations. The
LAS-ELC, in collaboration with lawyers and advocates in China, is engaged in a project to protect
Chinese female workers from workplace sexual harassment. See Legal Aid Society-Employment Law
Center (LAS-ELC), http://www.las-elc.orglindex.html (last visited March 1 0, 2009); see also discussion
infra note 50 (discussing the work of LAS-ELC). This project seeks to implement the Chinese Law on
Protection of Women's Rights and Interests. Similar questions regarding federal versus state rights, or in
the Chinese context, the role of provincial laws' interpretation and implementation of this national law,
are an important component of the project. For an interesting discussion of Chinese employment
discrimination laws, see Ronald Brown, China 's Employment Discrimination Laws During Economic
Transition, 1 9 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 36 1 (2006).
10. 429 U.S. 125 ( 1 976).
I I. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2009).
1 2. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1 2945(a) (West 2009) provides pregnant employees who work for
employers with five or more employees an unpaid, job-protected leave for a disability related to
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. The maximum amount of leave is four months, and
an employee is entitled to return to the same or a similar job.
1 3. 479 U.S. 272 ( 1 987).

REv.
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I. WORK, WELFARE, IDENTITY, AND SAFETY NETS
The tapestry of laws and attitudes surrounding work, welfare, and
dependency provides insight into workers' lives and shows how far the United
States still needs to travel to achieve a coherent safety net for all workers.
Consider this hypothetical worker: 14
Diane Benson, a twenty-five-year-old woman with two children, John,
six, and Alicia, four, terminated her marriage three years ago. Her ex
husband pays no child support and has moved out of town. She does
not know his address. Diane owns only her modest household
furnishings: beds for herself and the children, a couch, some tables and
chairs, a television, DVD player, and small CD player.
After high school, Diane attended her local community college for one
semester while working part-time for minimum wage. After getting
married, she dropped out of school, but continued to work until her son
John was born. Just when she planned to return to work, she became
pregnant with Alicia. After Alicia was born, Diane stayed home to care
for Alicia one year. When Diane's marriage ended, she worked in a
daycare center for a few weeks at minimum wage. She left when she
found a retail job close to home earning $8.25 an hour (above the
minimum wage) selling imported kitchenware and decorations,
although it did not provide any health insurance.
Diane has just learned that she is pregnant. What will be Diane's fate ,
if she misses several weeks of work or as much as four months of work
to have her baby? Might she lose her apartment because she cannot
afford to pay her rent? Might she lose custody of her children, if she is
unable to provide and care for them?
Work in the United States is a fundamental aspect of identity. 15 Yet much
of women's traditional work, including homemaking, housework, and
childcare, remains defined as outside of the world of work. 16 The culture of
domesticity in the nineteenth century kept middle-class women outside the
world of paid work, even as working-class women remained in the workforce.
Cultural imagination continued to place women's work in the home, even as
economic realities meant many women labored for wages. 17
1 4. This hypothetical is based on a classroom exercise developed by Professor Martha R. Mahoney,
University of Miami School of Law, for use in her Social Justice Law Class. See MARTHA R.
MAHONEY, JOHN O. CALMORE & STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY
SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 73 (2003).
IS. See Vicki Schultz, Life 's Work, 1 00 COLUM. L. REv. 1 88 1 , 1 884 (2000).
1 6. Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege in the Workplace: The Missing Element in Antidiscrimination
Law, in STEPHANIE M . WILDMAN WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY MARGAL YNNE ARMSTRONG, ADRIENNE D.

DAVIS & TRINA GRILLO, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA

25, 26-27 ( 1 996).
1 7. In the late 1 700s, "approximately 64 percent of the non-native popUlation lived in families
engaged in self-employment, 20 percent were slaves, and only 1 6 percent were wage workers or
indentured servants." TERESA AMOTT & JULIE MATTHAEI, RACE, GENDER, AND WORK: A MULTI
CULTURAL ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 295 (2d ed. 1 996). With the rise of

HeinOnline -- 21 Yale J.L. & Feminism 123 2009-2010

1 24

Yale Journal of Law and Feminism

[Vol. 2 1 : 1 1 9

Federal regulators monitor the U.S. economy to ensure some level of
!
unemployment. 8 Specifically, the economy functions by maintaining a flexible
or contingent workforce so that a certain number of workers stand ready to take
jobs as needed in the economy, creating a human ebb and flow. Yet how can
these contingent workers subsist when employers lay them off?
The unemployment insurance benefits system, a federall y mandated
!9
program jointly-funded with states, serves as one safety net. Deborah
Maranville has documented the gender bias inherent in unemployment
20
insurance that does not take women's working biographies into account.
Women comprise large numbers in the contingent workforce and often leave
jobs as Diane Benson did because of family-related reasons. These workers
often do not qualify for unemployment insurance. Furthermore, since
unemployment benefits are based in part on the amount of salary earned over
time while working outside the home, this system fails to credit non-salaried,
!
unpaid work inside the home?
In contrast to unemployment insurance, created without women's needs in
mind, the federal government originally enacted welfare to provide
22
supplemental income for predominantly white women. Yet the cultural
meaning of welfare has evolved into a notion of "undeserving poor" as
3
recipients? By contrast, persons with physical and mental disabilities, as well
as social security recipients, constitute the "deserving poor" in the cultural
24
ImagmatIOn.
All individuals require some form of livelihood to subsist. Without paid
work, some other means must provide daily subsistence. Thus, work is related
.

.

•

factories during industrialization,paid work outside the home increased at a phenomenal rate; by 1 990
ten times as many people worked for wages, compared to those self-employed. Id. In 1 975, 47.4% of
women with children under eighteen years old participated in the labor force. U.S. DEP T OF LABOR,
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 1 8 (2007). By 2006,
70.6% of women with children under eighteen years old participated in the labor force. Id.
1 8. Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 523-24 (1 997) (observing that while most regard a drop in unemployment as good news, federal
economic policy keeps unemployment high enough to prevent inflation caused by rising wages). Federal
regulators "refer to five or six percent civilian unemployment" as "natural" and seek to maintain that
level. Id.
1 9. See, e.g. , CAL . UNEMP. INS. CODE (West 2009).
20. Deborah Maranville, Changing Economy, Changing Lives: Unemployment Insurance and the
Contingent Workforce, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.1. 291 ( 1 995) (discussing the inadequacy of unemployment
benefits for women with children).
2 1 . See CAL .UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 1275- 1 282 (West 2009).
22. Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem ofBlack Citizenship, 1 05 YALE L.1. 1 563, 1 570
( 1 996) ("The first matemalist welfare legislation was intended for white mothers only."); see also
MAHONEY, CALMORE & WILDMAN, supra note 1 4, at 549-5 1 , 556-58 (explaining the evolution of
welfare from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) and discussing criticisms of welfare reform efforts and welfare-to-work programs).
23. Joel F. Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle ": The Interpretation of Entitlements,
Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 899,906-31 ( 1 990); see
also Roberts, supra note 22 (discussing the historical exclusion of black people in the welfare system
and its implications).
24. Handler, supra note 23,at 944.
'
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to the systemic and cultural operation of these programs-unemployment
insurance, welfare, and social security. If a Diane Benson is unable to work,
should she get welfare or unemployment insurance? Would a paid leave,
enabling her to have her child and care for herself and her family, better serve
her needs as well as society's goal of individual economic self-sufficiency?
Beyond providing economic self-sufficiency, work creates a sense of self
identity and pride. The venerable adage "an honest day' s work for an honest
day' s pay" reflects a philosophy that is ingrained in American society. Work
itself retains value and integrity, regardless of the status or salary of the job.
The opportunity for paid employment provides an inclusiveness that weaves
individuals into the fabric of society? 5 This connection furnishes not only a
sense of financial worth but also creates membership in a workplace
community and in society at large,z6
The PDA was an important legislative piece in this mosaic of work,
subsistence, and safety nets, seeking to ensure that paid work remained open to
women who became pregnant. Nondiscrimination on account of pregnancy
remains an important aspect of this scheme providing a safety net to workers,
but it alone cannot afford the security that all workers, particularly women,
need. The PDA illustrated the powerful role of federal legislation in the
subsistence and nondiscrimination package. Yet state laws also have played a
key role in this struggle for workplace equality.
By inscribing the notion that differential treatment of a woman worker on
account of pregnancy constitutes sex discrimination under federal law, the PDA
remains a crucial piece of federal antidiscrimination legislation. As a federal
law, it carried particular significance when passed, since many state laws had
not considered the potential plight of pregnant workers who might lose their
jobs as a result of pregnancy. California was one exception. The California
Legislature, recognizing that nondiscrimination alone could not provide
adequate security for women workers, enacted the Pregnancy Disability Leave
27
law (PDL) to provide an affirmative safety net.
The PDL created a
substantive guarantee of unpaid leave for pregnant workers rather than only
prescribing an equality path that treated such women the same as other workers
with temporary disabilities.
Indeed, these divergent federal and state responses set the stage for the
conflict epitomized by the different arguments proffered by women' s rights
28
advocates in California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra. This
case analyzed "whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended

25. See Schultz, supra note 1 5, at 1 930.
26. See id. (discussing how paid work fosters a robust conception of equality in society).
27. Pregnancy Disability Leave Law, ch. 1 32 1 , 1 978 Cal. Stat. 431 9 (codified at CAL. GoV'T CODE
§ 1 2 945 (West 2009»; see also Review of Selected 1978 California Legislation, 1 0 PAC. L.l. 255, 461
(1 979).
28. 479 U.S. 272 ( 1 987).
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by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1 978, pre-empts a state statute that
requires employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled
,,
by pregnancy. 29 The case focused feminist litigators on the need for greater
workplace protection and how best to achieve that goal for the Diane Bensons
in the workforce.
II. THE PDA AND THE CALIFORNIA PREGNANCY DISABILITY LEAVE LAW:
LEGISLATION LEADING TO CAL. FED.
The U.S. Supreme Court held in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert that
pregnancy-based classifications did not constitute sex discrimination under
Title VII of the 1 964 Civil Rights Act. 30 The employer in the Gilbert case had
provided comprehensive disability insurance but had excluded only pregnancy
related disabilities. The U.S. Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA) in 1 978 as a response to the Gilbert decision.3 1 Architects of the
PDA believed and intended that the statute mandated treating pregnant women
workers exactly the same as male workers with temporary disabilities. 32
The PDA failed to provide any job-guaranteed protection for the countless
women of childbearing capacity in California who work, women like Diane
Benson. Many of these workers were single heads of households and most
worked out of economic necessity. 33 In essence, under the PDA, pregnant
employees could be treated as well or as poorly as similarly situated male

29. Id. at 274-75.
30. 429 U.S. 1 25 ( 1 976); see also Nicholas Pedriana, Discrimination By Definition: The Historical
and Legal Paths to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 2 1 YALE 1. L. & FEMINISM I (2009)
(analyzing the legal developments leading to the Gilbert decision). See generally Henna Hill Kay,
Equality and Difference: The Case ofPregnancy, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. I (1 985).
3 1 . Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 ( 1 979) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2009» . As the
Supreme Court stated in Cal. Fed. :
The PDA added subsection (k) to § 701 , the definitional section of Title VII. Subsection (k)
provides, in relevant part: "The tenns 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work, and nothing in section 703(h) of this title shall be interpreted to pennit
otherwise."
479 U.S. at 277 n.6.
32. See Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as
Amici Curiae, Cal. Fed. 479 U.S. 272 (No. 85-494) (additionally arguing that the state law can be
reconciled with the PDA under their analysis of preemption).
33. See Brief for California Women's Law Center as Amici Curiae, Cal. Fed. , 479 U.S. 272 (No.
85-494) (arguing that minority women have a slightly greater workforce participation rate than white
women and that more than half of the total number of families at the poverty level are headed by
women); see also HOWARD BERMAN, PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND PREGNANCY BENEFITS-A
BRIEF HISTORY, I ( 1 978), in FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION, INDEX FOR RULEMAKING
( 1 978) app. J . I (asserting that the denial of temporary disability benefits for pregnant workers had
"potentially devastating economic consequences for millions of working women," the bill added Cal.
Labor Code § 1420.35 to the Fair Employment and Housing Act, now codified at CAL. Gov'T CODE §
1 2945) (on file with authors).
.
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employees who had an incapacitating, non-pregnancy related, temporary
medical condition. Employers decided the fate of these workers, including if
and to what extent they might be provided or be denied workplace leave or
other accommodations.
In contrast to the approach taken by Congress, California had already
enacted the PDL, which Governor Jerry Brown signed on September 28,
1 978.34 The PDL provides that a pregnant employee of an employer with five
or more employees is entitled to up to four months of job-protected leave
because of pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition.35 Instead of
equating pregnancy to non-pregnancy related, incapacitating, temporary
disabilities which affect both men and women, the California law sought a
proactive measure designed to provide an affirmative accommodation to
pregnant employees. This accommodation came in the form of an unpaid
pregnancy leave to be used solely for the actual period of time that an employee
was unable to work. While adding job-guaranteed leave, the PDL also
contained a provision making it an unlawful employment practice to refuse
such accommodation.36 Thus the California Legislature addressed the onerous
impact on pregnant women who worked for employers without any job
guaranteed leave.
Prior to the Gilbert decision in 1976, the Federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had promulgated generally accepted sex
discrimination guidelines, which banned benefit plans that excluded pregnancy-

34. Pregnancy Disability Leave Law, ch. 1 32 1 , 1 978 Cal. Legis. Servo 4593 (West) (now codified
at CAL. GOy'T CO DE § 1 2945 (West 2009)). Introduced in California as Assembly Bi11 1 960, the PDL
added CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420.35 to the Fair Employment and Housing Act, now codified at CAL.
GOy'T CO DE § 1 2945.
35. Pregnancy Disability Leave Law, supra note 34, § 1 2945(a). Initially, A.S. 1 960 provided that
a pregnant employee would be provided an unpaid leave of "four months or the amount of leave time
made available to other employees, whichever is greater." A.B. 1 960, 1 977-1978 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1 978). The bill went into effect on January I , 1 979. The POL provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational
qualification:
(a) For an employer to refuse to allow a female employee disabled by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions to take a leave for a reasonable period of time not to exceed
four months and thereafter return to work, as set forth in the commission's regulations. The
employee shall be entitled to utilize any accrued vacation leave during this period of time.
Reasonable period of time means that period during which the female employee is disabled
on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
An employer may require an employee who plans to take a leave pursuant to this subdivision
to give the employer reasonable notice of the date the leave shall commence and the
estimated duration of the leave.
CAL. Goy'T C O DE § I 2945(a) (West 2009). (The meaning of the language in the current version of the
statute does not differ significantly from the provision that was the subj ect of the Supreme Court's Cal.
Fed. decision.)
36. California Civil Rights Amendments of 1 999, ch. 591 , 1 999 Cal. Legis. Servo 34 1 2 (West)
(codified at CAL. GOy'T CO DE § 1 2945(b)(l) (West 2009)) ("[I]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice . . . for an employer to refuse to provide reasonable accommodation for an employee for
conditions related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, if she so requests, with the
advice of her health care provider.").
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related disabilities while covering temporary disabilities.37 California's Fair
3
Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) had similar guidelines. 8 In spite of
these guidelines, Gilbert ruled that the differential treatment violated no law.
In order to remedy the holding of the Gilbert case and provide a level
playing field for pregnant women, California State Assembly Member and
Majority Leader H oward Berman articulated the demographic foundation for
enacting the PDL:
Given the fact the number of working mothers has more than tripled
since 1950, and about 85 percent of all working women are presumed
to become pregnant at some time during their working lives, it was
asserted that the denial of temporary disability benefits for that period
when a women is physically unable to work due to pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions had potentiall� devastating
economic consequences for millions of working women.3
B erman recognized that disparate health and disability plans, such as the one
contested in Gilbert, were only the tip of the pregnancy discrimination iceberg
impacting women workers with regard to the terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment.
Prior to the enactment of the PDL (A.B. 1960), California pregnancy laws
applied only to school board and school district employees. "It was the intent of
[the PDL] to expand protections and benefits to all workers affected by
pregnancy, yet not set a limit on what constitutes pregnancy discrimination as
40
contained in FEC sex discrimination regulations.' . A pregnant employee was
allowed to return to "her same job, or a similar job with at least the same rate of
pay with full accrual of benefits, if she has taken a pregnancy leave for a period
not exceeding four months (unless greater leave time is available . . . ; in that
,,
case for a period consistent with employer leave policy). 4I
As one involved lawyer stated,

37. See EEOC Employment Policies Relating to Pregnancy and Childbirth, 29 C.F.R. § 1 604. 1 0(d)
(2009) (requiring that any benefit plan "which is in effect on October 3 1 , 1 978, which does not treat
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions the same as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work," must comply with § 1 604. 1 O(b), which requires
pregnancy-related disabilities to be "treated the same as disabilities caused or contributed to by other
medical conditions, under any health or disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection
with employment."); see also EEOC Agency Program to Promote Equal Employment Opportunity
Rules, 29 C.F .R. § 1 614. 1 02(a)-(b) (2009) (authorizing the agency to "develop the plans, procedures and
regulations necessary to carry out its program" to "maintain a continuing affirmative program to
promote equal opportunity and to identify and eliminate discriminatory practices and policies.").
38. Formerly known as the Fair Employment Practices Commission, the California agency whose
mandate is to enforce the Fair Employment and Housing Act, California's civil rights employment and
housing law, is now known as the Fair Employment and Housing Commission. See CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 2, § 741 0 (2009).
39. BERMAN, supra note 33, at I ; see also Brief for California Women's Law Center, supra note
33, at 6, 8.
40. BERMAN, supra note 33, at 2.
4 1 . HOWARD BERMAN, SUMMARY OF AB 1 960, CHAPTER 1 32 1 OF 1 978, at 3 ( 1 978), in FAIR
EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISSION, INDEX FOR RULEMAKING app. 1. 1 (1 978).
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The PDA did not go far enough, and we could do better in California
and we did. Treating all employees the same is fine if you work for a
progressive employer, but it is a particular hardship for pregnant
women who do not have job-guaranteed leave that gives women the
time off they need to recuperate from pregnancy, childbirth or related
42
medical conditions.
Judith Kurtz, who filed an amicus curiae brief in the Cal. Fed. case remarked:
Without a law like the PDL, poor women and women of color faced
harsh consequences because they were particularly susceptible to job
loss, denial of advancement and promotional opportunities, and other
employee benefits such as vacation and sick leave, to the extent that
they were provided. Women in higher paying jobs often had the ability
43
to negotiate a better deal for themselves on their own behalf.
California lawyers supported the PDL, believing it was the best next step on the
road to workplace protection.
III.

LILLIAN GARLAND'S ROLE IN ESTABLISHING A RIGHT To HAVE A CHILD
AND KEEP ONE'S JOB

While Diane Benson is a hypothetical person, her circumstances typify
those of many working women. One woman, Lillian Garland, lived a nightmare
not unlike that of Diane Benson. Lillian Garland had worked for several years
as a receptionist in commercial loans for California Federal Savings and Loan
Association (Cal. Fed.). She enjoyed her work, which required eight and a half
hour days with a forty-five-minute lunch and two fifteen-minute breaks. She
answered telephone calls and interacted with bank clients, many of whom were
celebrities.
When Ms. Garland became pregnant, she expected to return to work after
her baby's birth. Her supervisor had asked her on several occasions when the
baby was due and when Garland planned to resume her job. Garland trained her
44
replacement and took an unpaid "pregnancy disability leave'.4S to have her
child. When she informed Cal. Fed. that she wished to return to work on April
20, 1982, at the end of the eight week leave, Cal. Fed. told her that they had
filled the position in her absence and that no similar position was available. Ms.

42. Telephone Interview with Ann Noel, Executive and Legal Affairs Sec'y, Cal. Fair Employment
& Hous. Comm'n (Oct. 29, 2008).
43. Telephone Interview with Judith E. Kurtz, former counsel for Equal Rights Advocates, Inc.
(Dec. 2 1 , 2008); see Brief for Equal Rights Advocates et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 2, Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 ( 1 987) (No. 85-494) (arguing that, without a
right to return, a pregnant worker faces termination at a time when family income is most dependent on
her contributions).
44. Brief for Lillian Garland, Real Party in Interest as Amicus Curiae at 5, Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. 272
(No. 85-494).
45. Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. at 278.
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Garland, mother of an infant daughter and the sole support of her child, was out
of a job.
"I just felt faint, I was cold all over," reported Ms. Garland. "Before the
baby was born, my supervisor kept asking when I was leaving and when I'd be
coming back, so it never occurred to me that I might lose my job because I'd
6
had a child. I was in total shock.'.4 Ms. Garland had been born and grew up on
her grandmother's farm in Finleyville, Pennsylvania, attending high school in
Pittsburgh. The granddaughter of a white woman, a former chorus girl who had
married a black man, her family raised her to "fight for her beliefs." She also
derived "strength and comfort" from her religious roots. And she needed her
job; she was a loyal employee who felt "betrayed and hurt.'.47 Ms. Garland
looked for work in bars and restaurants, in sales, and in finance companies.
Without a job, she could not pay rent, and she lost her apartment. She moved
into a friend's living room and slept on the couch. She agreed to let her ex
husband, the baby's father, care for the child until she found a job. By the
spring of 1 983 he had sued for and obtained custody. 48
Understandably distraught, Ms. Garland tried calling unions and legal aid
organizations, seeking redress. Eventually she spoke with a lawyer at the state
Department of Fair Employment and Housing, the state's civil rights agency,
and asked, "Is there anything I can do?" The lawyer responded, "Oh, you
,
betcha," but he also told her that this case would be "really big.' 49 He asked if
she could handle it. He also advised her to find an attorney and gave her a list
of names. Ms. Garland bonded with Linda Krieger at the Legal Aid Society
Employment Law Center (LAS-ELC) in San Francisco.5o Later in the litigation,
another LAS-ELC attorney, Patricia Shiu, took over the case. For these
attorneys, Lillian Garland symbolized many working class women who had no
safety net when faced with loss of a job.
From the employer's perspective, it had done nothing wrong and was
merely following the law. The employer claimed it had a right to terminate any
employee who had taken a leave if a similar position were not available when

46. Tamar Lewin, Maternity Leave: Is it Leave, Indeed?, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,1 984,at F23.
47. Pamela S. Leven, A Mother Wins a Right to Her Job, AM. BANKER, Jan. 26,1 987,at IS.
48. Amy Wilentz, Garland's Bouquet: A Landmark Supreme Court Ruling Supports Pregnancy
Leave, TIME, Jan. 26, 1 987, at 14; see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS (2002) (discussing
how stereotypes of African American women and flaws in the child welfare system degrade their
reproductive decisions and support the removal of their children).

49. Telephone Interview with Lillian Garland, real party in interest in Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. 272
24,2008).
50. Founded in 1 9 1 6, the Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center (LAS-ELC) is a private.

(Sept.

non-profit civil rights organization devoted to serving and advancing the workplace rights of low
income workers and their families. The LAS-ELC has five program areas: Gender Equity; Community

Legal Services; Racial Equality; Disability Rights; and National Origin, Immigration, and Language
Rights. The LAS-ELC engages in litigation, education, counseling, legislative and policy work in
California and throughout the United States. See Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center
http://www.las-elc.orglindex.html(last visited March

1 0,2009).
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51
the employee chose to return. But several laws, both state and federal,
governed the dispute between Ms. Garland and Cal. Fed. over the proper
treatment of a pregnant employee. State fair employment law, federal anti
discrimination law, and a specially-enacted congressional amendment to the
federal law all interacted to require further judicial interpretation concerning a
pregnant worker's rights and remedies.
In Lillian Garland's case, Cal. Fed.'s policy had made unpaid leaves
available to all workers for "a variety of reasons, including disability and
,,52
pregnancy.
However, Cal. Fed. expressly reserved the right to terminate an
employee returning from leave, if no similar position were available.53 Cal.
Fed. did terminate her employment, following the birth of her child and her
attempt to return to work. Ms. Garland filed a complaint with California's
Department of Fair Employment and Housing, the state civil rights
enforcement agency. She "wanted to be the last woman to have to suffer for
,,
deciding to have a baby. 54 The Department charged Cal. Fed. with violating
the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Cal. Fed. responded by filing a
suit against the Department in federal district court, seeking a declaration that
Title VII, the federal employment statute as amended by the P DA, pre-empted
the state fair housing and employment law. Because, reasoned Cal. Fed., it had
complied with federal law by treating all workers in the same manner, its
conduct must be legal.
The Federal District Court of the Central District of California agreed with
Cal. Fed. and with the Merchants and Manufacturers Association and the
California Chamber of Commerce, which had joined the lawsuit seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief.55 Judge Manuel Real held that the California
PDL56 mandating pregnancy leave required illegal preferential treatment of
female workers. 57 He held that Title VII of the 1 964 Civil Rights Act, as
amended by the PDA, preempted the state pregnancy leave policy, and he
declared the state policy void pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. The Court
reasoned that the state statute would subject California employers to liability
under Title VII for reverse discrimination suits brought by temporarily disabled
males. Disabled males would not receive the same treatment as female
employees disabled by pregnancy, who were entitled to take a leave under the
state law.

5 1 . See generally Brief for Petitioners at 1 2, Cal. Fed. 479 U.S. 272 (No. 85-494) (arguing that
"there is no evidence in the record to support the notion that neutral disability leave pmctices that do not
provide the reinstatement guamntees required by the California law fall more harshly on women").
52. Cal. Fed. , 479 U.S. 272, 278 (1987).
53. [d.
54. Patt Morrison, Job Litigant Asked God To Guide Justices, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14,1 987, at A I .
5 5 . Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v . Guerm, No. 83-4927R, 1 984 WL 943 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2 1 ,
1 984).
56. CAL. GOV'T CODE § I 2945(a) (2009).
57. Cal. Fed. , 1 984 WL 943.
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After the district court ruling, Ms. Garland filed a motion to intervene in
the litigation to protect her legal interest in the outcome of the case. She was
concerned about her lack of status as a party, not knowing whether the state's
Department of Fair Employment and Housing or its Fair Employment and
Housing Commission would pursue an appeal beyond the circuit court level, if
that appeal became necessary. Judge Real denied her motion. 58 Ultimately, the
59
Ninth Circuit upheld that denia1.
California appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
seeking to uphold the state law. In an opinion authored by Judge Warren
Ferguson, the appeals court reversed the lower court decision. The Ninth
Circuit ruled that "the conclusion that . . . [California's pregnancy leave law]
discriminates against men on the basis of pregnancy defies common sense,
,,
misinterprets case law, and flouts Title VII and the PDA. 60 Reasoning that
Title VII's preemption clause did not prevent states from "extending their
,,
nondiscrimination laws to areas not covered by Title VII, 61 the court
emphasized the theory of federalism that permits a state to legislate for the
welfare of its citizens. The court reviewed the pregnancy exclusion cases,
including Geduldig v. Aiello and Gilbert, observing that Congress had enacted
the PDA to counter the false logic of those cases that had held that the
exclusion solely of benefits affecting pregnancy was not sex discrimination.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the PDA did not require a state to ignore
pregnancy in its quest to achieve equal opportunity in employment. The Ninth
Circuit found that the PDL did not violate Title VII as amended by the PDA
nor did Title VII preempt the state law.
Once the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the State of California, the Fair
Employment and Housing Commission began to fashion regulations pursuant
to the newly enacted PDL that would elaborate and clarify the rationale and
enforcement of the PDL. 62 The regulations were designed with the impending
63
litigation of Cal. Fed. before the Supreme Court in mind. The Commission
intended to promulgate regulations that supported the holding and rationale set
64
forth in the Ninth Circuit opinion. In fact, the Supreme Court's opinion in
58. See generally Brief for Lillian Garland, supra note 44 (arguing that the Fair Employment and
Housing Commission's appellate interests diverged from those of Ms. Garland).
59. Cal. Fed., 1 984 WL 943.
60. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 393 (9th Cir. 1 985).
6 1 . /d. at 394 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 1 03 ( 1 983» .
62. Telephone Interview with Ann Noel, supra note 42.
63. /d.
64. E-mail from Ann Noel, Executive and Legal Affairs Sec.'y, Cal. Fair Employment and Hous.
Comm'n, to Patricia Shiu (Nov. 23, 2008, 1 8:21 :00 PST) (on file with authors). Ann Noel participated
in the drafting of these regulations. She noted:
The Commission wanted to set forth clearly for the Court the proposition that the California
Legislature had understood in passing then 1 2945(b)(2) [which is now renumbered to be
1 2945(a)] that 'equal' treatment of pregnant women-giving them the same leave that was
available to men or non-pregnant women-could have an adverse impact if the employer's
leave policy did not give women time to be off for pregnancy, childbirth and recovery from
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ultimately referred to the Commission's proposed regulation, its
interpretation of § 12945(b)(2).65 The Court also cited to a precedential
commission decision construing § 12945(b)(2).66
Once the Supreme Court granted Cal. Fed.'s petition for certiorari, Ms.
Garland and her counsel responded to a flurry of media requests for radio
interviews, television appearances, and newspaper interviews. Ms. Garland and
her counsel, including counsel for the State of California, Marian Johnston,
accepted many of these invitations. After having been denied access to the case
as a party entitled to briefing and oral argument, Ms. Garland and her counsel
utilized the media as a channel to present her case. They sought to educate the
public, not only in California, but throughout the country, about all workers'
need for a job-guaranteed pregnancy disability leave like that provided for
pregnant employees in California, and for workplace leaves and
accommodation for the American workforce.67 Ms. Garland symbolized the
single working mother who should not be forced to choose between her job and
her child. She was the person whose story resonated with thousands of workers.
Some cases, such as this one, lend themselves to a public education campaign
that captures the imagination of society and provide a human face to a legal
issue. These appearances continued through the U.S. Supreme Court litigation
including oral argument and the decision.
Cal. Fed.

IV.

FEMINISTS DEBATE THE MEANING OF EQUALITY

Lillian Garland's situation-her need to merge her life roles as a worker
and as a pregnant woman-was not unique. Many women combined workforce

childbirth. This was the argument in our briefs to the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court
and we wrote our regulations with this in mind. In addition, we wanted to clearly state (also
disputed by employers) that a 'leave' meant that one had a right to return to the job (this was
not articulated in the statute at the time). Further, that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy was a form of sex discrimination and thus, a failure to hire, discharge, pay less,
etc., because of pregnancy was a violation of the FEHA as a form of sex discrimination. The
Supreme Court seemed to buy all of this and we were very, very pleased with the outcome of
the Cal. Fed. decision.
Id.

65. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 276 ( 1 987).
66. Id. at 276 n.4 (citing Matter of Accusation of Department of Fair Employment and Housing v.
Travel Express, FEHC Dec. No. 83-1 7, 1 983 WL 36466 (Cal. F.E.H.C. Aug. 4, 1 983) (holding that
employer's termination of a pregnant employee and failure to reinstate her after her pregnancy disability
leave violated Section 1 2945(a) and (b)(2), which prohibit pregnancy discrimination and require
employers to provide job-protected leave while an employee is disabled because of pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical condition».
67. Some of the more notable appearances included a conversation with Susan Deller Ross on the
Today Show and numerous radio interviews. The print media covered this case extensively. See Glen
Elsasser, Job Guarantee in Pregnancy Upheld, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1 987, at C3; AI Kamen, Coun
Upholds Pregnancy Leave Laws: Special Benefits for Women Ruled No Violation of Rights Statutes,

WASH. POST, Jan. 1 4, 1 987, at A I ; David G. Savage, Justices Uphold Pregnancy Leave: California Law
Granting Women Their Jobs Back Is Ruled Valid, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1 4, 1 987, at A I ; Stuart Taylor, Jr.,
Job Rights Backed in Pregnancy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1 4, 1 987, at A I .
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participation and motherhood. In 1986, 49.8% of women aged fifteen to forty
four years old who gave birth to a child participated in the labor force.68 Yet the
reality of a pregnant woman worker presented challenges to the U .S. legal
system that had consistently conceptualized the ideal worker as one
69
unencumbered by family obligations. Industrialization led to debate in the
feminist legal community about how best to achieve the inclusion of women in
the world of work, even as women's presence in that world continued to
increase. This debate implicated both the meaning of equality and the
attainment of safe and healthy job conditions for all workers.
Even before women's rights litigators had ever heard of Lillian Garland or
California Federal Savings and Loan, they were arguing in Montana about a
pregnancy leave issue similar to that which the Cal. Fed. case would ultimately
bring to the U .S. Supreme Court . 70 In 1979 the Miller-Wohl Company, owner
of several women's apparel stores, had hired Tamara Buley to work as a sales
clerk in its Three Sisters store in Great Falls, Montana. 71 During her first month
on the job, Ms. Buley missed several days of work as a result of a pregnancy
related illness. 72 Company policy denied sick leave to all employees with less
than one year of service . 73 As a result of these absences, the company fired Ms.
Buley. 74
Ms. Buley filed a complaint with the Montana Commissioner of Labor and
Industry, claiming pregnancy discrimination in violation of the Montana
Maternity Leave Act (MMLA). 75 Miller-Wohl responded by filing a
declaratory judgment action in federal court, seeking a ruling that the Montana
76
statute was both unconstitutional and violated Title VII. The district court
upheld the Montana pregnancy leave statute against this challenge, finding that
77
the statutory protection of pregnant women posed no problem.
68. u.s. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, June 1 990-2006, Supplemental Table 5
(2008), available at http://www.census.gov/populationlsocdemo/fertility/cps2006/SupFertTab5.xls. By
2006 the number of women who gave birth to a child and also worked had climbed to 55.9% of women.
Id.

69. Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bomstein, The Evolution 0/ "Fred "; Family Responsibilities
Discrimination and Developments in the Law a/Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS LJ. 1 3 1 1 ,

1 320 (2008) ("[M]ost good jobs in the United States still assume an ideal worker-a workplace model
that was designed for a workforce of male breadwinners whose wives took care of family and household
matters."). See generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2000) (discussing how the work/family conflict represents
gender discrimination that stems from the flawed system of organizing work).
70. See Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus.,5 1 5 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1 98 1 ).
7 1 . Id. at 1 265.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The Montana Maternity Leave Act provided, in relevant part, that it is unlawful to ( I )
"terminate a woman's employment because of her pregnancy;" and (2) "refuse t o grant t o the employee
a reasonable leave of absence for such pregnancy." MONT. CODE ANN . §§ 39-7-203{ l ), 39-7-201 (prior
to 1 983 amendment).
76. Miller-Wahl, 5 1 5 F. Supp. at 1 266.
77. Id.
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Following the Geduldig reasoning, the court wrote: "Merely because
pregnancy is a physical condition singled out by the law does not necessarily
,,
make it a sex based classification or violate the Equal Protection Clause. 78 The
court further explained that the Montana Act's legislative purpose was gender
neutral because it sought to place male and female workers on an equal footing,
allowing both to work when they had children. A pregnancy leave would
ensure that a working wife's salary would not be lost to the family unit. Finally,
the court noted that Miller-Wohl could easily comply with the PDA and the
Montana law by allowing reasonable sick leaves to all its employees.
Commenting in a law journal about the case and its implications, Linda
Krieger and Patricia Cooney wrote that "Miller- Wohl sparked a serious
controversy, one might even say a crisis, in the feminist legal community over
,,
the meaning of equality for women. 79 Women's rights attorneys Involved in
the passage of the PDA viewed equality as mandating equal treatment of
women and men. If non-pregnant employees would lose their jobs for absence
in the first year of employment, then pregnant employees should suffer a
similar fate. Any other policy would contravene Title VII and be "dangerous
,,
for women. 80 Other feminists regarded such "equal treatment" as resulting in
more inequality for women. 8 ) Under this view, employers should be required to
take positive action, often in the form of reasonable accommodation, to ensure
fairness in the workplace for all workers.
Miller-Wohl appealed from the adverse district court ruling against it, but
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case,82 setting the stage for
Lillian Garland and her dispute with Cal. Fed. to become the center of the
debate. This controversy, begun by Miller- Wohl and continued through Cal.
,,83
as to the
Fed. , revealed the "absence of consensus among feminists
definition of equality. It also, as Krieger and Cooney pointed out, illuminated
different conceptions of the process of social change. 84

78. ld.
79. Patricia N. Cooney & Linda 1. Krieger, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment,
Positive Action and the Meaning a/ Women 's Equality, 1 3 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 5 1 3, 5 1 5 ( 1983).
80. See Brief for State of Oregon at 1 8, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 4 1 2 (No. 1 07) ( 1 908) (arguing
that "long hours of labor are dangerous for women primarily because of their special physical
organization").
8 1 . See Cooney & Krieger, supra note 79, at 537 (questioning the dangers presented by some
equality models, arguing that "equality can't, in and of itself, effectuate equality between sexes," and
advocating for "equality of effect").
82. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal because the "federal claims contained in employer's
declaratory judgment complaint were defenses to employee's state claim and thus failed to create
requisite federal question." Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 685 F.2d 1 088, 1 088 (9th
Cir. 1 982).
83. Cooney & Krieger, supra note 79, at 536.
84. ld. at 5 1 6.
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In a much-cited article, Wendy Williams reflected on the limitations of
5
litigation as a strategy for achieving full societal participation for women.8
Reflecting on the limited role that courts could play in social change, Williams
emphasized that change needed to come from legislatures. According to
Williams, courts could "only review in limited and specific ways the laws
,,
enacted by elected representatives. 86 She elaborated: "[Courts'] role in
promoting gender equality is pretty much confined to telling legislators what
,, 7
they cannot do, or extending the benefit of what they have done, to women. 8
Williams acknowledged, however, that how courts thought about equality
impacted decisions, judgments, and strategies in other spheres of decision·
rnakmg.88
Turning to the Montana law, Williams pointed out that well-meaning
legislators who intended to help pregnant workers passed the Act.89 But, she
argued, "[t]he philosophy underlying [the statute was] that . . . the law should
, 9o
take special account of pregnancy to protect that role for the working wife. ,
Advocates for such protection could argue that procreation provides women
with an important role worthy of special protection, and that without such
guardianship, society could not adequately ensure women' s safety.91 These
arguments, according to Williams, illustrate how deeply and culturally
embedded in society is this urge to treat pregnancy as unique.92 Williams
cautions against succumbing to that argument, urging rather the benefits of the
equal treatment approach that she saw embodied by the PDA. For Williams, the
PDA equal treatment mandate presented a clear alternative to the special
treatment model. "If we can' t have it both ways, we need to think carefully
,,
about which way we want to have it. 93 Williams chooses equal treatment and
concludes with a call to create a new order that would leave stale cultural
.
94
. the past.
assumptions m
As women' s rights lawyers debated litigation theories and strategies,
change was brewing in Washington, D.C. As a California state assembly
member, Howard Berman had helped to pass the 1978 PDL that created a four
month disability leave for new mothers.95 B erman had been representing
California on Capitol Hill for a little over a year when Judge Manuel L. Real

85. Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism,
7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 1 75 ( 1 982).
86. Id. at 1 75.
87. [d.
88. !d.
89. [d. at 1 94.
90. [d.
9 1 . !d. at 1 95.
92. !d.
93. !d. at 1 96.
94. [d. at 200.
95. RONALD D. ELVING, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: How CONGRESS MAKES THE LAW 1 7-34
(1 995) (describing Bennan and the Washington coalition).
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ruled in the federal district court that the state law Berman had helped to pass
violated Title VII.96 Berman wanted to change federal law to ensure that
employers would grant leaves for new mothers.97
Berman contacted Donna Lenhoff, then Associate Director for Legal
9
Policy and Programs at the Women's Legal Defense Fund, for assistance. 8 She
reached out, in turn, to Wendy Williams and Susan Deller Ross, both of whom
99
had worked on the issue before. Williams had been counsel of record in the
00
Gedu/dig case, and Ross had written a brief in the Miller- Wahl case. 1 They
agreed with Lenhoff in characterizing Berman' s approach as special treatment
for pregnant women, viewing it as a dead-end for leave policies. lol In an early
meeting with Congress member Maxine Waters and others, Berman argued for
a legislative strategy to enact a federal pregnancy leave policy. 102 However,
Lenhoff critiqued that approach as short-sighted and urged a different tactic: a
03
leave policy that would apply to women and men. 1
A month after the district court decision in Cal. Fed. , another California
representative, George Miller, convened a hearing before a new congressional
l04 Hearing
committee that targeted problems of young people and families.
testimony from Congress member Patricia Shroeder, Columbia University
Professor of Social Work Sheila Kamerman, and others, the hearing introduced,
for the first time at a national level, the suggestion of parenting leave for all
workers. 105
Against this backdrop of potential legislative change, advocates prepared
briefs for the Cal. Fed. oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Following California' s victory in the Ninth Circuit, the feminist legal
,,
community was "in a state of tension and disarray. 1 06 The Southern California
chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) wanted to file a brief
supporting the state law. But the national ACLU overruled that decision. 107
Ultimately the national ACLU filed a brief, declaring it supported neither party,
but rather "more fully represent[ ed] the interests of women workers than the
,,
positions taken by either of the parties. 108 The ACLU argued that protectionist
laws value women for their childbearing roles and undermine women's

96. Id. at 19.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 20.
1 00. Id.
1 0 1 . Id.
1 02. Id.
1 03. Id. at 2 1 -22.
1 04. Id. at 23-25.
1 05. Id. at 26.
1 06. MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REWRITING THE RULES 2 1 5 ( 1 994).
1 07. Id. at 2 1 6.
1 08. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae at 2, Cal. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 ( 1 987) (No. 85-494).
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capacity and reliability in the workplace. l09 Emphasizing biological differences
between men and women could justify protectionism and relegate women to "a
separate sphere of home and family." I IO
Members of the Southern California ACLU chapter, led by UCLA law
professor Christine Littleton and then-USC law professor Judith Resnik,
formed the Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the Workplace (CREW) to
file an amicus curiae brief in support of the state law and a remedy for Lillian
Garland. I I I This group included "Betty Friedan, Planned Parenthood, the
International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) , the California
Federation of Teachers, and 9 to 5," as well as "Hispanic groups that wanted to
retain the protection of the maternity-leave law for minority women working in
,,
unorganized job situations. 1 12 CREW's brief argued that the state statute
remedied "a form of sex discrimination not . . . addressed by federal law-the
discriminatory impact that inadequate leave policies have on working women's
' ,, 1 13
. ht 0f procreative
. chOIce.
ng
The Women' s Rights Project of the ACLU and National Organization for
Women (NOW) agreed with Cal. Fed. that the state law violated Title VII.
They urged: "We don't think women are weak and in need of special
,,
assistance. 1 14 Describing those arguing in favor of relief for Garland by
upholding the state law, a NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
spokesperson said: "It is history repeating itself. It is an invitation to
discriminate. . . . [Such an employment law says ] 'you pregnant women
,
,
you're different. ", 1 15 Advocates siding with Cal. Fed. feared not only different
treatment for pregnant women, but also discrimination against all women that
might result from the burden of accommodating pregnancy.
The dispute between the parties and the feminist amici on both sides turned
on whether equality meant identical treatment or whether equality meant
identical opportunity. For example, equal treatment proponents argued that no
worker should get his or her job back unless every worker could return from a
leave with a guarantee of a job. Alternatively, equal opportunity advocates
urged that equality meant providing the same opportunity to all workers. For

1 09. Id. at 1 3- 1 7.
1 1 0. Id. at 1 8.
I I I . HARRINGTON, supra note 1 06, at 2 1 6.
1 1 2. Id.
1 1 3 . Brief of Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the Workplace, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 3, Cal. Fed. , 479 U.S. 272 ( 1 987) (No. 85-494).
1 14. DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN'S MOVEMENT: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND
SOCIAL RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA 2 1 8 (2004).
1 1 5. KATHERINE R. ALLEN & KRISTINE M. BABER, WOMEN AND FAMILIES: FEMINIST
RECONSTRUCTIONS 1 93 ( 1 992). According to Baber and Allen, "Don Butler, president of the California
Merchants and Manufacturers Association, stressed this likelihood in his comments after the . . .
decision: 'If I'm an employer and I've weighed all the candidates, I'm going to hire either a male or an
older woman . . . . And that is discrimination we don't want, but it will happen because business people
are practical. '" Id.
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example, men could have children without risking loss of their j obs, so the state
pregnancy leave statute protected women in the same way that men already
were protected. The word equality, itself, did not provide an answer as to how
to look at the case.
Commentators often characterized the debate as one between sameness and
difference. Reflecting this tendency, Martha Chamallas identified the 1980s as
marking the emergence of the "Difference Stage" in feminist legal theory.1 1 6
This debate between sameness and difference has also been couched as a
choice between equal treatment versus special treatment. Yet that very
"equaVspecial" language created bias as to the debate' s preferred outcome,
making it difficult to find language for an even-handed discussion about the
meaning of equality. Cultural favor for equality is strong, while the American
work ethic frowns upon special treatment. Missing from the
"sameness/difference" and "equaVspecial" sound bites to describe the debate
was any language that would include woman in the fullness of her potential
identity. The woman of color, poor woman, lesbian, or older woman who did
not fit the default privileged categories unthinkingly ascribed to "woman,"
remained invisible in this formulation of the choice about the meaning of
equality.
Catharine MacKinnon elaborated upon the critique of the comparison
mode prevalent in equality theory that underlay the debate, explaining that only
two paths to equality have been allowed to women. Women must either "be the
,, 1
same as men" or "be different from men. 1 7 MacKinnon continues:
Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to our
correspondence with man, our equality judged by our proximity to his
measure. Under the difference standard, we are measured according to
our lack of correspondence with him, our womanhood judged by our
distance from his measure. Gender neutrality is thus simply the male
standard, and the special protection rule is simply the female standard,
but do not be deceived: masculinity, or maleness, is the referent for
I IS
both.
Under "sameness/difference" language, men remain the measure of equality,
again shifting focus away from "woman" as her characteristics cut across
.
' categones. 1 19
numerous 1' dentity
Also critiquing the debate, Deborah Rhode illuminated the "mixed
ideological consequences" of its legacy. 120 Legislation that mandates maternity
1 1 6. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 39 (2d ed. 2003).
1 1 7. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 33
( \ 987); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 477, 492 ( 1 996)
(describing the tension between equal treatment and special treatment as "especially problematic" in
cases involving battered women as defendants).
1 1 8. MACKINNON, supra note 1 1 7, at 34.
1 19. WILDMAN, supra note 1 6, at 22-24 (arguing that the Koosh ball, with its multiple moving
strands, best encapsulates the dynamic and multidimensional nature of identity).
1 20. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 122 ( 1 989).
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l eaves "may help to break the stereotype of childbearing women as provisional
121
employees" with no real commitment to work outside the home.
Yet when
employers offer maternity rather than parenting leaves, they maintain
stereotypes of children being women's responsibility and render women's role
as wage earners l ess visible, because the linguistic emphasis remains centered
on mothering.
V . CAL. FED.

IN

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

Amici filed thirteen briefs and the Supreme Court set the case for oral
argument on October 8 , 1986. David Savage reported on the beginning of the
122
oral argument when Theodore Olson argued for the bank.
Olson began by
arguing that "the federal mandate of equal protection must prevail over the state
,,
policy of special protection. 123 He explained that California employers were
�apped: If they complied with federal l aw they violated the state law. He urged
that the federal law should preempt the state statute.
Justice O'Connor interrupted early on. She said, "Well, Mr. Olson, I guess
in theory an employer could comply with the California law by offering female
employees a pregnancy leave and comply with Title VII by offering a
comparable leave to other disabled employees. If that is the case, how is the
, 1 24
California law preempted?,
Olson conceded that the compliance suggested by her hypothetical was
1 25
theoretically possible, but he called it "an end run" around the issue. Justice
O'Connor's question and this interchange provided a glimpse into the
reasoning that would prevail in the majority opinion authored by Justice
Marshall.
Marian Johnston, a Deputy Attorney General argued on behalf of the State
,
of California that California's "guarantee that pregnant employees not lose their
jobs,, 126 was not inconsistent with the federal goal of eliminating discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy as articulated by Title VII as amended by the PDA.
She urged that pregnancy disability leave was "neither preferential nor
prejudicial to either men or women; it's simply an equalizer making sure that
women, like men, don' t have to choose between employment and childbirth"
and that "women can compete equally with men on that basis.,, 127 Johnston

1 2 1 . [d.
1 22. DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 707 1 ( 1 993).
1 23. [d.
1 24. [d.
1 25. [d.
1 26. Transcript and audio recording of oral argument available from Oyez, U.S. Supreme Court
Media, http://www .oyez.orglcaseS/1 980-1989/1 986/1986_85_494/argumentl (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
1 27. [d.
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observed that in situations in which individuals are not similarly situated,
,,
"similar treatment may in fact lead to inequality. 1 28
Garland had traveled to Washington, D.C. to observe the oral argument
before the Supreme Court. Outside the courthouse, she was speaking with
reporters and video crews when she saw a group of teenage girls staring at her.
She left the cameras and approached the group, telling them, "I am fighting for
you; I am fighting so you will be able to one day, if you decide to get married
and have a family, you'll be able to keep your job if you want to have a baby."
,,
One of the young women looked at her and said, simply, "Thank yoU. 129
On January 13, 1987, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit ruling,
upholding California's law against Cal. Fed. 's challenge, but relying upon a
slightly more nuanced analysis. The Court held that the POL is not inconsistent
with the PDA because compliance with both statutes is not a "physical
impossibility" since "employers are free to give comparable benefits to other
,,
disabled employees. 130 Writing for the majority, Justice Thurgood Marshall
quoted the court of appeals language that "in enacting the PDA Congress
intended ' to construct a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may
" , 131
not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise.
The Court first considered whether federal law preempted the California
state statute, examining congressional intent. The Court noted that Congress
had disclaimed any intent to "occupy the field of employment discrimination
law" in passing Title VII. 1 32 The Court then turned to the issue of whether the
state law conflicted with the federal law and "whether the PDA prohibit[ed]
states from requiring employers to provide reinstatement to pregnant workers,
,
regardless of their policy for disabled workers generally. , 133 To analyze the
question, the Court returned to the PDA' s language, legislative history, and
historical context, commenting that Congress had passed the PDA as a response
to Gilbert. 1 34 The PDA reflected Congress' disapproval of the Gilbert court' s
reasoning that discrimination against pregnant workers did not constitute sex
discrimination. Congress had conducted hearings that included extensive
evidence of discrimination against pregnant workers. That history, observed the
Court, was "devoid of any discussion of preferential treatment of
,,
pregnancy. 135 Rather, opposition to the PDA had arisen from those who
wished to continue to treat pregnancy differently, to the detriment of pregnant
women, by excluding pregnancy coverage in health or disability benefit plans.

1 28.
1 29.
1 30.
131.
1 32.
1 33.
1 34.
1 35.

[d.

Morrison, supra note 54.
479 U.S. 272, 291 ( 1 987).
[d. at 279-80 (quoting 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1 985» .
/d. at 28 1 .
[d. at 284.
[d. at 285.
[d. at 286.
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Congress was aware of state statutes like California's, but "apparently did not
consider them inconsistent with the PDA. ,, 1 36
The Court noted the common goal of the PDA and California statute was
"to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers. ,, 137 The
Court observed that the state statute did not require employers to violate Title
VII. Employers could comply with both statutes by giving all employees
comparable benefits to those given to pregnant workers.
For Justice Scalia, the case turned on the PDA language which stated,
"Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field . . . to the exclusion of State
laws on the same subject. ,, 138 Cal. Fed.'s tactic, suing in federal court and
claiming the PDA overrode state law offended Scalia as directly contrary to
,
the plain statutory language. Concurring in the judgment, Scalia wrote, "no
\ 39
more is needed to decide this case. ,,
Writing in dissent, Justice White found that conclusion of the majority to
be "untenable. ,, 14o Rather, the dissent opined that California could not have
intended to require employers to make broader disability leaves available to all
workers: "Congress intended employers to be free to provide any level of
disability benefits they wished-or none at all-as long as pregnancy was not a
factor in allocating such benefits. ,, 141 The dissent viewed the California statute
as providing preferential treatment in violation of the PDA echoing the
,
disagreement that some of the feminist legal community had also voiced. 142
The battle between sides of the litigation had become painfully divisive in
the feminist legal community. As friendships fractured over the disagreement
,
the schism wrought by the case highlighted the important goal of permitting
women to both bear children and remain employed. The passion in the
arguments for accommodation and the vigor of those pressing equal treatment
led to a decision that helped society envision a world where both outcomes
were possible. As Justice Marshall opined the California law was a "statute
,
that allows women as well as men to have families without losing their
,
,
.
143
JObs. ,,
The California response to pregnancy leave vindicated by the U.S.
,
Supreme Court in Cal. Fed. , may have grown out of the disability rights
movement that originated at the University of California at Berkeley in the

1 36.
1 37.
1 38.
1 39.
1 40.
141.
1 42.
1 43.

[d. at 287.
[d. at 288 (citations omitted).
[d. at 282 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1 964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (West 2009» .
[d. at 296.
[d. at 302.
[d. at 303-04.
[d. at 304.
[d. at 289.
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1 970s. 144 California's employment laws, among the most progressive state
laws, have provided greater protections for workers with disabilities than
145 Today, the Prudence Kay Poppink
federal disability law since the 1970s.
Act, named after a woman who championed employment rights for all workers
in California, continues to be a model for federal law. In 2000, the state
legislature amended the Act extensively to redefine disability much more
broadly, and to limit, · if not invalidate, any interpretation of the federal
Americans with Disabilities Act that might circumscribe the scope and
application of the California law. 146
In fact, the amicus curiae brief that Lillian Garland had filed in the
Supreme Court analyzed the breadth and scope of California's state disability
discrimination law, urging the Court to see the pregnancy leave provision in the
context of the entire statutory scheme. 147 Advancing a unique argument, Ms.
Garland asserted that California's PDL, as just one provision of California's
Fair Employment and Housing Act, did not conflict with the PDA because the
disability discrimination protections also found within the FEHA provided
reasonable accommodation to all covered employees with disabilities, ensuring
equal treatment to all workers. 148
Ms. Garland's brief argued that California's expansive view articulated by
the FEHA extended employment protection to a wide range of individuals who
are disabled. 149 The California Supreme Court broadly interpreted the definition
of "physical handicap" to include such diverse disabilities as allergic
conditions, smoking related illnesses, high blood pressure, and various types of
,
diseases, including conditions that are both "physical" and "handicapping. , 1 5o
The term "handicap" includes not only current, manifest, physical limitations,
but also future conditions. 1 5 1 This extensive definition would have covered a
144. See generally Disability Rights Advocates, http://www.dralegal.org (last visited Feb. 24,
2009).
1 45 . MaIjorie Gelb & JoAnne Frankfurt, California 's Fair Employment and Housing Act: A Viable
State Remedyfor Employment Discrimination, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1 055, 1 1 05 (1 983).
1 46. Prudence Kay Poppink Act, 2000 Cal. Stat. 1 049 (amending the disability provisions of the
FEHA, including new definitions to CAL. GOy'T CODE § 12926 and defining unlawful conduct in §
1 2940) (codified at CAL. GOy'T CODE §§ 1 2926, 12940, 1 2955.3, 1 923 1 (2008) & CAL. CIy. CODE §§
5 1 , 5 1 .5, 54 (2008)); see also Claudia Center, Disability Discrimination in the Workplace: State Versus
Federal Law Protections, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, 34TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT
LAW 299 (2005); Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining "Disability " Discrimination: A
Proposal To Restore Civil Rights Protectionsfor All Workers, 14 STAN. L. & POL ' y REv. 321 (2003).
147. Brieffor Lillian Garland, supra note 44, at 1 0, 1 4.
148. ld. at 1 5- 1 7.
149. ld. at 1 3- 1 6; see also Gelb & Frankfurt, supra note 145, at 1 1 05.
1 50. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 32 Cal. 3d 603, 608 ( 1982).
1 5 1 . ld. at 6 1 0. Arguably, the accommodation provided to pregnant women under FEHA §
I 2945(b)(2) is no more extensive than that provided to employees with non-pregnancy related
disabilities under the FEHA's other disability provisions and regulations. Both the pregnant employee
and the employee with a non-pregnancy related disability are afforded reasonable accommodation under
the FEHA. The former is entitled to reasonable accommodation which California's legislature defines as
an unpaid leave of up to four months. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1 2945(b)(1 ) (West 2009). The latter is also
entitled to reasonable accommodation, which, depending on the particular disability, may include a
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disability suffered by a male employee that was similar to pregnancy.1 52
Moreover, the FEHA's mandate for reasonable accommodation, which
included a reasonable period of unpaid leave for males with non-pregnancy
related disabilities, is equivalent if not tantamount to providing leave to
pregnant workers.
California's history of promoting the rights of workers, specifically rights
for women and persons with disabilities, paved the way for the POL. It is no
coincidence that, even prior to Ms. Garland's termination from California
Federal Savings and Loan, advocates were working closely with the California
Legislature to expand further the rights of all employees who were struggling to
grapple with the competing demands of work and family.
VI. TH E MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA FOR EXPANDED WORKPLACE LEAVES AND
ACCOMMODATION

Beginning in the 1980s and continuing after the Cal. Fed. decision,
California advocates sought to enact job protections for workers with families.
They recognized that all workers needed time away from work to care for
themselves and their families and to bond with their children. The California
1
Legislature 53 and many California advocates knew that female workers were

disability leave and right to reinstatement. See, e.g., CAL. Goy'r CODE § 1 2926 (West 2009); see also
Fisher v. Superior Court, 1 77 Cal. App. 3d 779 ( 1 986). Recognizing the recurring and relatively
consistent nature of disabilities associated with pregnancy, as well as the efficiency of determining
appropriate accommodation on a class-wide basis, the legislature adopted § 1 2945(b)(2) to provide a
standard accommodation policy for all pregnant women. See 1 999 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 591 (West). The
fact that such a uniform standard has not been developed with respect to other disabilities is not an
indication that those other disabilities are accorded less protection. Rather, the absence of a uniform
standard reflects the impracticality of such a standard in other cases. Just as disabilities vary regarding
their affect on physical ability, so do the accommodations, which are tailored to meet each physical
handicap. See CAL. GOy'r CODE § 1 2926.1 (West 2009). It is clear from both the language and the
intent of the disability protections of the FEHA that other employees not so affected by pregnancy, but
similar in their inability to work are entitled, if necessary, to accommodation of up to four months leave
and reinstatement. Id. California law therefore does not mandate disparate treatment of men and women
under its disability laws. Inferentially, Title VII does not preempt § I 2945(b)(2) of the FEHA. Brief for
Lillian Garland, supra note 44, at 1 7 .
1 52. I n 1 986 when the LAS-ELC filed its amicus curiae brief o n behalf o f its client, Lillian
Garland, California's FEHA did not require that a covered disability be permanent or have a defined
duration. See CAL. GOy'T CODE § 1 2940(a) (West 1 980). Indeed, the California Supreme Court's
opinion in American National Insurance. Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission. , 32 Cal. 3d
603, 6 1 0 (1 982), held that high blood pressure is a physical disability because it is "physical" and "often
it is handicapping." This very broad definition of the term "physical disability" preceded the passage of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1 2 1 1 1 , in 1 990, which severely restricted the definition
of disability under federal law. See Center & Imparato, supra note 146, at 323.
1 53 . See BERMAN, supra note 33, at I (stating that because "the number of working mothers has
more than tripled since 1 950, and about 85 percent of all working women are presumed to become
pregnant at some time during their working lives . . . den[ying] temporary disability benefits" to women
who are disabled because of "pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions had potentially
devastating economic consequences for millions of working women").
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1 54
likely to become pregnant at least once during their working lives. Without
job-guaranteed leave, these women could lose their jobs. Thus a greater
percentage of women than men would be adversely affected by the absence of
job-protected leave. Male employees needed time off work for non-pregnancy
related, incapacitating medical conditions. 1 55 Many women in the workforce at
that time were, as now, low-income female workers, women of color, and
single heads of their households who were the primary wage earners. 1 56
California advocates labored to expand workplace rights to leaves and to other
forms of accommodation for all workers at the same time that they fought
against attacks on the POL, like the Cal. Fed. litigation.
The POL, one of the most progressive laws of this type in the United
States, served as a powerful foundation for legislating leave and workplace
accommodations for working families. Aware of the debate among feminist
advocates nationally, state legislators and advocates faced the challenge of
expanding workplace leaves and other accommodations so that no other
working woman or man would have to endure the suffering to which Lillian
Garland had been subjected. Pragmatism played a major role in this movement.
In analyzing the then "current dispute over how pregnancy fits within a
model of sexual equality," one commentator stated that
continued adherence to the assimilationist model of racial equality and
persistent efforts to draw from it an adequate model of sexual equality
founder on the inescapable fact of sexual reproductive difference. We
should desist from further fruitless attempts to deny that which cannot
be changed and instead direct our energies to devising ways to
accommodate and neutralize the impact of those differences on the
lives of women and men. 1 57
The California movement tried to embody this spirit as it proceeded forward.
The notion of incremental change, built one step at a time with many
setbacks along the way, informed this movement to advance workplace rights.
In retrospect, the POL, coupled with advancing the rights of persons with
disabilities, laid the groundwork for this political process and the eventual
passage of several statutes to benefit the Diane Bensons of the state workforce.
These legislative enactments included the California Family Rights Act, which
1 54. See Brief for California Women's Law Center, supra note 33, at 16 (noting that eighty-five
percent of the women in the work force are likely to become pregnant at some point in their lives); see
also BERMAN, supra note 33, at I .
155. See BERMAN, supra note 33, at I .
1 56. See id. ; see also Brief for California Women's Law Center, supra note 3 3 (arguing that
minority women have a slightly greater workforce participation rate and that more than half of the total
number of families at the poverty level are headed by women); Brief for Equal Rights Advocates et aI.,
supra note 43, at 7 (arguing that, without a right to return, a pregnant worker faces termination at a time
when family income is most dependent on her contributions); Brief for Human Rights Advocates et aI.,
supra note 8, at 8 (arguing that "over 1 27 nations around the world and many international treaties
provide protection for pregnant working women, analogous to the protection afforded by the California
statute here at issue."); Brief for Lillian Garland, supra note 44, at 1 0.
1 57. Herrna Hill Kay, Models a/Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 39, 88 ( 1 985).
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provided a right to unpaid, job-protected leave for serious health conditions and
bonding; 1 58 the Victims of Domestic Violence and Employment Leave Act,
which guaranteed job-protected, unpaid leave for survivors of domestic
violence; 1 59 and the Paid Family Leave Act, which extended California's
disability insurance benefit program to cover caring for a family member with a
serious health condition or bonding with a child. 160 Advocates continue to
promote further legislation for paid sick days and greater coverage for existing
protections.
A. The California Family Rights Act

The first of these laws, the Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act, 161
also known as the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), preceded the passage
of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 162 The CFRA's
legislative history reveals a circuitous path that evolved over time, although the
legislature always intended to help workers meet the competing demands of
both work and family responsibilities. 163
Beginning in the early 1 9808, a concerted legislative effort pushed for the
enactment of state laws that would provide leave to workers. 1 64 In 1 985,
Assembly Member Gwen Moore introduced a bill regarding child-rearing leave
entitled the Parents' Rights Act of 1 985. 1 65 This bill originally provided one
year of unpaid leave for child rearing, but after several amendments between
66
1 985-86, the bill reduced the leave allowed from one year to four months. 1
The amended bill further defined "childrearing leave" as time off from work for
the birth, placement, and adoption of a child or the illness of an employee's
child, which was likely to require continuing treatment or confinement for at

1 58. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1 2945.2 (West 2009).
1 59. CAL. LABOR CODE § 230 (West 2009).
1 60. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 3300-3306 (West 2009).
1 6 1 . CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12945. 1-.2 (West 2009).
1 62. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1 993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2009).
1 63. See 1 99 1 Cal. Legis. Servo 5547, ch. 462 (West) (codified at CAL GOV'T CODE § 12945.2
(West 2009» . The Historical and Statutory Notes contained a letter, dated February 6, 1992, from
Assembly Member Moore to Governor Pete Wilson regarding the intent of A.B. 77, explaining that the
purpose of the bill was "to permit workers to take leave to care for their families without fear of job
loss" and that the bill had evolved over a seven year period and the process involved many hearings and
meetings. Id.

1 64. These observations derive from Ms. Shiu's participation both in the legislative process to
amend CFRA to comport with the FMLA and in the regulatory process as an invited participant to the
Fair Employment and Housing Commission's discussion of these changes.

1 65 . Assembly Member Moore introduced the Parents' Rights Act of 1985 (later amended to The
1 986) on February 7, 1 985 "to add Section 12945.2 to the Government Code,
relating to fair employment and housing." A.B. 613, 1 985-1 986 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1 986) (on file
Parents' Rights Act of

with the authors). This version of the bill did not ultimately pass.

1 66. The bill was amended in the Assembly on April 8, 1 985, May 14, 1985, June 24, 1 985, and
1986, July 3, 1986, and August I I , 1 986. Id.

further amended in the Senate on June I I ,
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least one month. 167 The final version of Assembly Bill 6 1 3 (which was never
passed) read:
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a) The United States is the only industrialized country that does not
have a mandated policy on child care leave.
(b) There is a shortage of out-of-home child care, particularly for
infants.
(c) More than 60 percent of the women of child-bearing age in the
United States are in the workforce and 40 percent of these women have
children under three years of age.
(d) Because of the changing roles of men and women in the workplace
and the family, both men and women should have the option of taking
leave for child-rearing purposes.
(e) Close contact between parent and child is in the best interest of the
child, particularly during the child's infancy and early years, and this
contact promotes family stability. 1 68
On January 22, 1 987, legislators proposed a similar bill, Assembly Bill
368, the Parent's Rights Act of 1 987. 169 The changes encompassed in this
proposed legislation reflect a refined response to parenting responsibilities
faced by workers.
Unlike the 1 986 version of this bill, the Parent's Rights Act of 1987
expressly prohibited discrimination on the basis of an employee's status as a
parent, a significant change in the legislation. The requirement that an eligible
"full-time employee" have worked more than one continuous year with the
employer and an average of thirty hours per week during the most recent six
months marked another important difference. Despite the significant decrease
in the amount of leave provided, the governor vetoed this bill. 1 7o Over the
years, numerous versions of and amendments to this bill surfaced. 1 7 I On
January 22, 1 987, legislators proposed a similar bill, Assembly Bill 368, The
Parent's Rights Act of 1 987. 172
Finally Assembly members Moore and Hayden and Senator Roberti, along
with many other assembly members and senators, introduced Assembly Bill
Number 77, The Family Rights Act of 1 99 1 . 173 A.B. 77 passed the Senate on

1 67. A.B. 6 1 3, as amended in the Senate on June 1 1 , 1 986.
1 68. [d.
1 69. A.B. 6 1 3, 1 985·1 986 Leg.,Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1 986).
1 70. Governor Deukmejian vetoed the bill on September 30, 1 987. Cynthia L. Remmers,
Pregnancy Discrimination and Parental Leave, 1 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 377, 4 1 1 ( 1 989).
1 7 1 . See id. at 4 1 2.
1 72. See The Parents' Rights Act of 1 987, A.B. 368, 1 987-1988 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1 987) at 4,
5; see also Remmers, supra note 1 70, at 4 1 2.
1 73. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1 2945.2 (West 2009); see also Remmers, supra note 1 70, at 4 1 2.
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August 30, 199 1 and the Assembly on August 31, 1991. Governor Wilson
174
signed it into law in September 1991.
The CFRA provides eligible employees who work for covered employers
(large employers with fifty or more employees) an unpaid, job-guaranteed
leave of up to twelve weeks in each twelve-month period for the following
purposes: (1) to care for one' s own serious health condition or that of spouse,
child, parent, domestic partner; and (2) to bond with a newborn, adopted, or
foster child. 175 Three notable exceptions to the CFRA distinguish it from the
FMLA. First, the definition of serious health condition excludes "leave taken
for disability on account of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical
,,
c onditions. 176 Thus under California law, the entitlement to a maximum of
four months of pregnancy disability leave under the PDL is separate and apart
from the CFRA leave. As a result, a pregnant woman in California can take a
maximum of four months of pregnancy disability leave under California's PDL
and take twelve weeks of bonding leave under the CFRA. Second, the medical
certification process for family members who need care is less stringent than
the three-tier medical certification process under the FMLA where an employer
may require a third and final medical opinion verifYing the serious health
I77
c ondition of a family member and the duration of the leave.
Finall y,
California' s right to medical privacy under Article I , Section I of the
California Constitution prohibits the disclosure of medical conditions,
diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment, and the CFRA regulations reflect these
c onstitutional protections. 178 Additionally, the Confidentiality of Medical
Infonnation Act prohibits health service providers from turning over private
identifiable medical infonnation without the express approval of the patient. 179
Preserving these three principles was critical to the CFRA amendments
0
enacted after Congress passed the FMLA. 1 8 The FMLA' s enactment
precipitated a series of subsequent amendments to CFRA to ensure that the
CFRA comported largely with the FMLA, except with respect to these three

1 74. Carl Ingram, Wilson Signs Family Leave Bill Into Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1 99 1 , at A3; see
also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1 945.2 (West 2009).
1 75 . CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1 2945.2 (West 2009).
1 76. Id. at § 1 2945.2(c)(3)(C).
1 77. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.307(c) (2009).
1 78. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining, safety, happiness and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I , § I ; see also Hill v. Nat'l. Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 865 P. 2d 633, 69 1 (Cal. 1 994) (citing Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gheradini,
1 56 Cal. Rptr. 55, 60 (Ct. App. 1 979» (stating that "a person's medical profile is an area of privacy
infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already judicially
recognized and protected"); CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 2, § 7297. 1 1 (2009) (permitting employers to utilize
any certification form, "provided that the health care provider does not disclose the underlying diagnosis
of the serious health condition involved without the consent of the patient").
1 79. CAL. CIv. CODE § 56 (West 2009).
1 80. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 -26 1 6 (2009) (enacted Feb. 5, 1 993); see also CAL. GoV'T CODE § 1 2945.2,
§ 1 9702.3 (West 2009).

HeinOnline -- 21 Yale J.L. & Feminism 148 2009-2010

2009]

Pregnancy Discrimination and Social Change

149

provisions. Again, pragmatism reigned: The legislature amended the CFRA to
enable California employers to comply with one family and medical leave law
and to relieve employers from having to comply with two slightly different
family and medical leave bills, which would have been an unnecessary and
1
burdensome compliance process for employers. 8 1 They are the result of a
specific legislative intent to preserve the PDL, protect the medical privacy
rights of California employees, and ease an unduly cumbersome medical
certification process for the care of family members. 182
B. Protecting Victims ofDomestic Violence

The passage of the California Family Rights Act (CFRA) served as a
catalyst for future legislative action in California. Enacted in 2000, the Victims
of Domestic V iolence and Employment Leave Act, authored by Assembly
Member Honda, provides a right to job-protected, unpaid leave for survivors of
domestic violence who work for employers with twenty-five or more
employees, under specific circumstances. 183
In California, unemployed workers are generally entitled to unemployment
insurance benefits unless they engage in misconduct connected with their most
recent employment or if they leave voluntarily without good cause. However,
to ensure that survivors of domestic violence do not sacrifice income while
engaging in safety planning to relocate, California's Unemployment Insurance
Code grants unemployment insurance benefits where an employee quits a job
,, 4
for "good cause. 1 8 In California, an individual may be deemed to have left his
or her most recent work for good cause if the employee leaves a job to protect
his or her children, herself, or himself from domestic violence.18 5

1 8 1 . The FMLA does not preempt state laws, such as the CFRA, which provide greater protections.
See 29 U.S.C. § 265 1 (b) (2009).

1 82. These observations derive from Ms. Shiu's participation both in the legislative process to
amend CFRA to comport with the FMLA and in the regulatory process as an invited participant to the
Fair Employment and Housing Commission's discussion of these changes.
1 83. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230. 1 (West 2009). The Victims of Domestic Violence and Employment
Leave Act permits employees who are victims of domestic violence or sexual assault to take time off
from work:
( I ) To seek medical attention for injuries caused by domestic violence or sexual assault; (2)
To obtain services from a domestic violence shelter, program, or rape crisis center as a result
of domestic violence or sexual assault; (3) To obtain psychological counseling related to an
experience of domestic violence or sexual assault; (4) To participate in safety planning and
take other actions to increase safety from future domestic violence or sexual assault,
including temporary or permanent relocation.

/d.

1 84. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1 256 (West 2009).
1 85. Id.
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C. Paid Family Leave

The Family Temporary Disability Insurance Law, also known as the Paid
Family Leave Act (PFL), the next major piece of legislation, expanded
workers' rights to paid leave : 86 California's existing short-term disability
insurance (SOl) provided partial income replacement for qualifying employees
who could not work because of sickness or injury. 187 The PFL, effective July 1 ,
2004, builds on that SOl scheme and provides six weeks of partially paid leave
each year to all employees-regardless of tenure or size of their employer-to
care for a seriously ill parent, child, spouse, or domestic partner or to bond with
a newborn, adopted, or foster child.
This statutory scheme interfaces with other laws for California workers in
this way. The federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides twelve
weeks of unpaid leave to address a serious health condition of an employee or
family member or for bonding. 188 In contrast, the California PDL provides four
months of unpaid, job-protected leave for pregnancy, childbirth, or a related
medical condition. 189 The FMLA and PDL leaves run concurrently. The CFRA,
as amended after passage of the FMLA, provides twelve weeks of bonding
leave for pregnant employees that can be used in addition to the four-month
PDL leave. 190 Finally, the PFL provides six weeks of partially paid leave that
runs concurrently with bonding leave under the CFRA and the non-pregnancy
leave aspects of the FMLA. The PFL applies to all employees regardless of
length of employment or size of employer.
The PFL is the most comprehensive paid leave law in the United States. It
is funded completely by employee payments to California's disability insurance
benefit program. PFL benefits cover a maximum of fifty-five percent of an

1 86. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3301 (West 2009). The PFL was enacted October I I , 2003, to
establish a temporary family disability insurance program that provides:
up to six weeks of wage replacement benefits to workers who take time off work to care for a
seriously ill child, spouse, parent, domestic partner, or to bond with a minor child within one
year of the birth or placement of the child in connection with foster care or adoption.
Id. The PFL simply extended the pre-existing statutory scheme for short-term disability insurance (SOl),
which was originally limited to the sickness or illness of the employee, to a broader scheme whereby an
employee could take partially paid leave, funded by SDJ, to care for a seriously ill family member or to
bond with a new child. Thus, PFL made it easier for employees to take off work by ensuring payment of
benefits under the SDJ program.
1 87. The introduction to the Unemployment Insurance Code states:
The purpose of this part is to compensate in part for the wage loss sustained by any
individual who is unable to work due to the employee's own sickness or injury . . . and to
reduce to a minimum the suffering caused by unemployment therefrom. This part shall be
interpreted liberally in aid of its declared purpose to mitigate the evils and burdens that fall
on the unemployed worker and his or her family.
Id. § 260 1 .
1 88. 2 9 U.S.C. § 2 6 1 2 (2009).
1 89. CAL. GOV'T CODE § I 2945(a) (West 2009).
1 90. Id. § 1 2945.2.
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employee's salary with a maximum weekly benefit of $959.00 in 2009. 191
Moreover, the maximum benefit will increase automatically each year in
accordance with increases in the state's average weekly wage. 1 92 The PFL
created a right, which did not previously exist, for employees of small
employers (those with less than fifty employees) to take time off work. The one
drawback of the PFL is that it does not provide a statutory right to
reinstatement, and thus does not provide a job-guaranteed leave. Nonetheless,
this law has served as the model for other states, including the recently passed
paid leave law in New Jersey. 1 93
The PFL, with its paid leave and , broad coverage, reflects years of
advocacy. Dozens of California community-based organizations, policy
makers, and advocates worked together to strategize about the need for paid
family leave and other initiatives that would help employees grapple with the
competing demands of work and family, creating a state-wide coalition in
200 1 . Many members had worked together over a twenty-five year period in
some capacity on the CFRA, its regulations and outreach, and on training
unions and workers across California. The work to achieve the PFL provides an
example of how coalitions form and strive to achieve a result that many
advocates only dreamt might happen.
Senator Sheila Kuehl, with her committed legislative aide, Jennifer
Richards, and Rona Sherriff from the Senate Office on Research, worked
closely with the California Labor Federation. Governor Gray Davis signed the
PFL amid a torrent of dire predictions from the employer community that such
a benefit would baQkrupt California's State Disability Insurance Program.
These predictions proved to be false. 194
Following passage of the PFL, the Legal Aid Society-Employment Law
Center, the Labor Project for Working Families, Equal Rights Advocates, Inc.,
and the Asian Law Caucus formalized their collective efforts on work and
1 9 1 . EMPLOYMENT DEV. DEP'T, DISABILITY INSURANCE AND PAID FAMILY LEAVE WEEKLY
BENEFITS AMOUNTS (2009), available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/pdCpub_ctr/de2588.pdf.
1 92. PAID FAMILY LEAVE COLLECTIVE, PAID FAMILY LEAVE FACT SHEET # 1 : TEN QUICK FACTS
(2008), available at http://www.paidfamilyleave.orglpdf/ l_ten_quickjacts.pdf. The Paid Family Leave
Collabomtive, which includes the Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center, the Labor Project for
Working Project Families, Equal Rights Advocates, Inc., and the California Women's Law Center,
created the fact sheet. The Asian Law Caucus was also a founding member. The Paid Family Leave
website includes updates on California's efforts to pass Paid Sick Days legislation, as well as a brief
history of the Collabomtive's work to pass California's Paid Leave Law. The Collabomtive is part of a
broader coalition, the Paid Leave Coalition, whose members are identified. See Paid Family Leave,
http://www.paidfamilyleave.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2009). Netsy Firestein, Executive Director of the
Labor Project for Working Families, and Irma Herrem, Executive Director of Equal Rights Advocates,
Inc., serve with Patricia Shiu as the leadership for the Paid Leave Collabomtive.
193. S.B. 786, 2 1 3th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2008) (enacted).
1 94. See generally Ruth Milkman & Eileen Applebaum, Paid Family Leave in California: New
Research Findings, in THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA LABOR 45 (2004), available at
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edulsoc/faculty/milkmanlpaidjamily_leave_scl.pdf. Ruth Milkman, Professor of
Sociology at the University of California in Los Angeles, has worked with the Paid Leave Collabomtive,
tracking usage mtes of the PFL.
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family issues and fonned the Paid Family Leave Collaborative. The California
Women's Law Center joined soon thereafter. Working closely with members of
the PFL Coalition, the PFL Collaborative endeavored to implement the
legislative priorities established by the PFL Coalition. The Collaborative
conducts the day-to-day work of enforcing the law by providing training
sessions, individualized advice and counseling, legal representation, and
outreach to unions, community-based organizations, and others. Client
concerns animate the Collaborative's work as clients educate lawyers about
needed legislative amendments to ensure the law best serves low-income
workers and their families.
D. Expanding Protections for Workers: Tasks Remaining

California legislators have made numerous attempts to expand the
coverage and protections under the CFRA as well as the PFL. For example, in
2000 Senate Bill 1149 attempted to decrease the 1,250 hours and one year of
employment requirements under the CFRA in order to cover seasonal and
195
migrant workers.
It also clarified the medical certification process so that
both employers and employees would understand its purpose and utilize it
properly. Senate Bill 727 sought to expand the definition of "family member"
under the Paid Family Leave Law to include siblings and grandparents in order
to more accurately reflect the variety of family structures in California beyond
the traditional nuclear family. 196 These legislative efforts, which reflect the
issues and barriers that the working class and the working poor have
experienced in trying to access leave, will continue. The Collaborative and the
Coalition will strive to assess, reassess, and redefine goals for extending leave
based largely on the needs of workers.
I ntroduced by Assembly Member Fiona Ma on February 22, 2008, the
"Healthy Families, Healthy Workplaces Act," Assembly BiIl 2716, provides
that employees who work at least seven days per year will accrue one hour of
paid sick leave for every thirty hours worked. 197 Employees who work for
small employers with ten or fewer employees may use up to a maximum of
forty hours of accrued paid sick leave, five days per calendar year, ninety days
after employment commences. Similarly, employees who work for other
employers may accrue a maximum of seventy-two hours of paid sick time and
may use a maximum of nine days per calendar year. Subject to these
1 95. S.B. 1 149, 1 999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000).
1 96. S.B. 727, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (expanding the definition of family
member).
1 97. A.B. 2 7 1 6, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008). In relevant part, this bill would establish a
minimum rate of accrual for sick days at no less than one hour for every thirty hours worked. Sick days
may be used, without discrimination or retaliation, for the diagnosis, care, or treatment of health
conditions of the employee or an employee's family member. The accrued sick days may also be used
for leave related to domestic violence or sexual assault.
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limitations, paid sick leave may be carried over to the following year, but
employees are not entitled to payment for any unused paid sick leave upon their
separation from employment.
Those employers who already provide paid sick time equivalent to that
provided by this bill are not required to provide any additional paid sick leave.
The bill stipulated that upon the oral or written request of an employee, an
empl oyer shall provide paid sick leave for (1) the diagnosis, care or treatment
of an existing health condition of the employee or a family member, or
preventative care for the employee' s own health condition or that of a family
member or (2) leave related to domestic violence or assault. Although approved
by the Senate Labor Committee, A.B. 27 16 failed in the Senate Appropriations
Committee. However, advocates will reintroduce it in 2009. 198 This proposed
legislation prohibits retaliation against an employee for asserting rights and
includes a private right of action for retaliation.
Modeled after a San Francisco ordinance that voters passed in 2006, which
required that employer provide paid sick leave to its employees, A.B. 2716 is
yet another example of how the movement for workers' rights to leave and
199
accommodation in California continues to flourish.

VII.

REFLECTIONS ON LESSONS LEARNED

2oo and Nan Hunter201 provides a
chance to consider the role of legal change in shifting culture and social
practice. Stoddard and Hunter debate about effective strategies in movements
for social justice. Stoddard had viewed New Zealand as a utopia for gay and
202
lesbian rights. But he found when he visited the country that, although it had
enacted formal legal rules, the society l acked a transformative consciousness?03
The absence of cultural transformation in the context of the presence of
An interchange between Thomas Stoddard

1 98. Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families for California, http://www.paidsickdaysca.org. (last
visited March 1 0, 2009).
1 99. The workers' rights movement for leave and accommodation is not unlike the California
movement to outlaw fetal protection policies and provide workers with practical options for working
with hazardous, toxic, and carcinogenic substances in the workplace. Since outlawing fetal protection
policies was only the first step in protecting the health and safety of workers, that movement crafted
very specific strategies designed to ensure that pregnant women who may be required to work with
hazardous, toxic or carcinogenic substances could seek, inter alia, affirmative job protections such as job
transfers, reassignments and/or temporary leaves of absence. See Caroline Bettinger-Lopez & Susan
Sturm, International Union, U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls: The History oj Litigation A lliances and
Mobilization to Challenge Fetal Protection Policies, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 2 1 1 -42 (Myriam Gilles
& Risa Goluboff eds., 2007).
200. Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law To Make Social Change,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (\ 997).
201 . Nan D. Hunter, LawyeringJor Social Justice, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 009 ( \ 997).
202. Stoddard, supra note 200, at 968-69.
203. !d. at 969-70.
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progressive formal rules prompted Stoddard to reflect on the interconnection of
law and culture as well as the use of law for social change.204
Stoddard views the traditional role of law as the formal rulemaking
function for society, including the creation of new rights and remedies for
victims and the alteration of the conduct of government, citizen, and private
entities. But in addition to rulemaking, law can provide a culture shifting
function by expressing a new moral ideal or standard and by changing cultural
attitudes and patterns. 20S Stoddard cites the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 as the
paradigm of legal reform proposed to make social change, believing it was
particularly effective coming from the democratic process as a congressional
enactment, rather than a pronouncement by a court or philosopher king. 206
Stoddard offers four factors that enable rule-shifting to become culture
shifting: ( 1 ) a change that is very broad or profound; (2) public awareness of
that change; (3) a general sense of the legitimacy (or validity) of the change;
and (4) overall continuous enforcement of the change. 207 He concludes with a
plea for social justice advocates seeking effective change to return to
legislatures, connect with the public, and pay more attention to the process that
2os
generates desired new rules.
Nan Hunter criticizes Stoddard's emphasis on legislatures, believing that
"the single most common and powerful activity within social change lawyering
has become the use of litigation to secure enforcement and expansive
,,
interpretation of statutes. 209 She singles out Stoddard's implicit belief that
social change can be achieved by majoritarian tactics. 210 She views this
assumption as particularly provocative in the area of gay and lesbian
equality.2 1 1
Hunter urges using all areas of lawyering as vehicles for mobilization and
not requiring a choice between litigating and lobbying. She also cites public
engagement as the key missing element in Stoddard's characterization of
ingredients necessary for culture-shifting. Her discussion of rewards for repeat
players in both the judicial and legislative arenas echoes Marc Galanter' s
comments about the need to strengthen the ability o f clients, constituencies, or

204. Id.
205. Id. at 973.
206. Id. at 985.
207. Id. at 978.
208. Id.
209. H unter, supra note 201 , at 1 0 1 2.
2 1 0. !d.
2 1 1 . [d. Nan Hunter's skepticism of achieving goals of change through majority mobilization is
particularly prescient in this era when Proposition 8, a voter-passed initiative which appeared on the
November 4, 2008, ballot in California, overturned the constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry.
See, e.g., Bob Egelko & John Wildermuth, Prop. 8 Foes Concede Defeat, Vow to Fight On; Gay Rights
Groups Have Challenged the Victory in Court, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2008, at B I ; Jesse McKinley &
Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A I .
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groups to be more effective in the repeat player role. 212 Finally, Hunter
emphasizes the need to link to non-law defined groups in the struggle for social
change.
Hunter and Stoddard suggest mechanisms for transforming society. What
light does the struggle for change over leave policies shed on this debate about
social change and how it happens? Both litigation and legislation have been
central components in this struggle. These mechanisms may not always be
within the control of the proponents or advocates for progressive change; such
was the situation in Cal. Fed., where the defendant, not the plaintiff, filed an
action for declaratory relief, setting the stage for the Supreme Court litigation.
Some goals may be more amenable to legislative action than to litigation, as
illustrated by the passage of several landmark worker-friendly leave laws in
California, where an empathetic legislature was committed to workers'
rights. 213 Yet litigation and the changed consciousness that the publicity
surrounding Cal. Fed. engendered also played an important role.
Analyzing this movement for job-protected, paid leave yields several
observations. First, in a democracy a movement's goal should be formulated in
a way that gives voice to those who are not often participants in decision
making.214 Democracy and democratic movements should maximize the
participation of all members of society.215 How can a movement ensure that the
fundamental needs and interests of those with the least political power and
access become integrated into the process of defining the goal and its success?
The needs and interests of women like Lillian Garland and the fictitious Diane
Benson ought to be at the forefront of the litigation strategy in the Cal. Fed.
case or the movement for leave in California. A democratic participation lens
216
would be helpful to any goal considerations.
Second, "words matter" in how a movement defines its goals. 217 To define
the PDL debate as one involving "special treatment" versus "equal treatment"

2 1 2. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves " Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits oj Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC'y REv. 95 ( 1 975) (explaining that litigation usually occurs between "Repeat
Players" and "One-Shotters" and discussing the advantages held by "Repeat Players").
2 1 3 . See supra text accompanying notes 1 53- 1 94. Courts also bear responsibility for protecting the
constitutional rights of the minority, whoever they may be at any given moment in history. United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 1 44, 1 52 nA ( 1 938).
2 14. Carol Gilligan is best known for popularizing this notion of voice and the idea that non
majoritarian groups may have a "different voice." CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT ( 1 982).
2 1 5 . Lani Guinier, More Democracy, 1 995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. I , 3-6, 1 6-20 ( 1 995); see also
Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody 's Market: The Political Economy oj Non
Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing oJ the Civil Rights Movement, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 247
(2000) (urging judges to consider implications for democracy of their decisions).
2 1 6. See, e.g. , Wildman, supra note 5, at 306-07 (outlining a participatory perspective).
2 1 7. Therese Stewart made this argument in the California marriage litigation. Therese Stewart,
Transcript of Oral Argument, In Re Marriage Cases (No. S I47999), March 4, 2008, available at
http://www.court.info.ca.gov/courtslsupreme!audio-arch.htrn.
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,,
connoted a culturally-based preference for an outcome labeled "equality. 21 8
B ut if the concept of "equal" did not include or address the socio-economic
status, race, immigration status, and protected classes to which many women
belonged, then the definition of "equal" reflected the reality of only some
women while excluding others. This term also seemed to be unduly focused on
the comparison to men or the male model, making it even more attenuated.219
The term "special" failed, however, to bring within the fold other protected
statuses that also comprise a woman's identity, like race and class, that were
particularly relevant in Lillian Garland's case. Noticing how strategies impact
identity categories like race or class, in addition to gender, might clarify goals.
Third, consider why California's well-established jurisprudence on
disability law did not play a more prominent role in determining the outcome in
Cal. Fed. Is it perhaps because Ms. Garland was relegated to filing an amicus
curiae brief in her own case before the Supreme Court? 220 The Ninth Circuit's
refusal to allow Ms. Garland to participate as a party in her own case-with all
of the access and power that only a party to litigation possesses-circumscribed
her "day in court" and deprived her of the opportunity to articulate, other than
as an amicus, the disastrous effect Cal. Fed.'s policy had on her life and her
child's. Just as movements should seek to include multiple voices,
decisionrnakers and policy creators should attend to voices from the bottom.221
Finally, in defining a strategy for achieving success, it is vital to assess
whose interests will be promoted more quickly and whose interests may be
compromised. Recognizing the strengths and limitations of various short-term
and long-term strategies and their effect on specific communities is critical.
Only when a movement acknowledges whose interests will become paramount,
secondary, tertiary, and remote when implementing a particular strategy, can it
actually grapple with the available choices. These choices may be limited and
less comprehensive choices than preferred, but choices remain nonetheless. A
movement must make conscious decisions about what is feasible, for whom,
and why.222

2 1 8. See generally Stephanie M. Wildman, Pregnant and Working: The Story of California Federal
Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES (Elizabeth M. Schneider &
Stephanie M. Wildman eds., forthcoming 201 0).
2 1 9. See MACKINNON, supra note 1 1 7, at 36.
220. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 274 ( 1 987).
22 1 . Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bol/om: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 324 ( 1 987) (suggesting that those who have experienced discrimination "speak
with a special voice" that provides a valuable resource to legal scholars and philosophers for
understanding the law and defining the elements ofjustice).
222. See Carolyn Lochhead, House OKs Contested Rights Bill for Gays, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 8,
2007, at Al ("The Employment Non-Discrimination Act would ban job discrimination against gays,
lesbians and bisexuals, but not against transgender people . . . . [D]ropping transgender people from the
anti-discrimination bill, known as ENDA, enraged gay leaders and tore apart the gay community."); see,
e.g., Editorial, An Overdue Step for Equal Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at A26 (supporting ENDA
despite its exclusion of discrimination based on "gender identity," which would have protected
transgender individuals, because "[t]hroughout American history, civil rights have been achieved in
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The movement in California for the PDL as well as family and medical
leave under the California Family Rights Act, and later the Victims of
Domestic Violence and Employment Leave Act, which secured unpaid leave
for survivors of domestic violence, initially did not contain any provision for
paid leave, an important and essential element for working class and working
poor women without which the leave remained out of reach. 223 It is likely that
no such bill would have been introduced because it would have gone too far too
soon and needed to be built up slowly .224 When the legislature introduced the
CFRA, it appeared that the bill would pass only if it provided unpaid leave and
only if it applied to large employers with fifty or more employees. The
obstacles were clear to Assembly Member Moore and Senator Roberti, but they
decided to press forward with a bill that was more limited in scope rather than
forego an incremental step in advancing the concept of family and medical
leave.
Being receptive to continuously revising strategies as circumstances arose,
while devising alternate strategies during the constant struggle to assess,
reassess, and modify approaches, typifies the progression of social change
movements . A movement may even redefine goals to reach them, but in new
and different ways than previously contemplated . From the outset, seemingly
insurmountable challenges to providing paid leave via the PDL, CFRA, and
FMLA mounted. But without income protection how could the working poor
avail themselves of job-protected leave? While state temporary disability
insurance benefits provided some income protection, the absence of paid leave
was and continues to be a barrier for those who cannot take leave because they
cannot forego their income. In 2004, California's Paid Leave Law provided an
extension of state temporary disability benefits for employees who care for
seriously ill family members .225 Yet it still does not contain an express right to
job-guaranteed leave, meaning that those who take this leave can presumably,
although not necessarily, be lawfully terminated, with no apparent legal
recourse under this statute's language. Advancing a legislative strategy requires
acknowledging its limitations, while nonetheless gaining the support of most, if

incremental steps"). Some argue that omitting protections for transgender people set the movement
back, rather than propelling it forward. See Gabrielle Russon, Gay-rights Milestone Draws Transgender
Activists ' Outcry; Anti-discrimination Protections in Bill Won 't Cover Group, CHI. TRIB. Oct 1 8, 2007,
at 8 ("For many gay activists, a non-discrimination bill that omits transgender people would write
immorality into the law, akin in their view to a civil rights bill that protects blacks but not Hispanics.").
223. See generally Ann O'Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L I (2007) (arguing that low-wage working women have little access to paid
and unpaid leave because they are less likely to have worked for the same employer for one year or
work full-time).
224. Telephone Interview with Barbara Boxer, U.s. Senator from California (Spring 1984). This
conversation with Senator Boxer about the viability of including a paid component to the CFRA led Ms.
Shiu to conclude that the political process for gaining acceptance to leave as an important workplace
benefit required an incremental, albeit potentially lengthy political process.
225. S.B. 727, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
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not all, stakeholders. Embracing visionary goals for an inclusive society
demands recognition that political limitations exist.
Advancing broader job-protected, paid leave goals requires coalition
building among diverse communities.226 Voices from all walks of life must be
affirmatively sought and heard. For example, the Paid Family Leave Coalition
includes a wide array of more than seventy organizations representing various
communities ranging from the Older Women's League to the California Labor
Federation.227 Coalition members can educate each other about the issues with
which each community struggles; define and explore common ground; and,
most importantly, communicate in ways that further identify and refine
common goals and common measures of success. These coalition practices
play an important role in setting the political, legislative, and litigation strategy.
At the core, it is the clients-the workers and their families-whose voices
must be heard in defining goals and how such goals might be achieved.
In examining the struggle for job-protected, paid leave, it is helpful to look
at other workers' rights movements. Existing laws (particularly in places like
California that have demonstrated a commitment to workers' rights) and the
coalitions that made those laws possible may provide guidance. One successful
strategy may already exist and be modified, enabling a coalition to advance
social change with an informed approach. For example, California advocates
modeled Assembly Bill 27 1 6, a state paid sick day bill, after the San Francisco
city ordinance providing paid sick days. State advocates conferred with the San
Francisco ordinance advocates on their analysis, strategy, and language. 228
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, reflecting in 1989 on the ACLU Women's Rights
Project Supreme Court agenda, urged that feminist litigators progress from
courts to legislatures to complete the work of equality for women. "If women
were dominant in our legislatures, what would their program be?", she asked. 229
"Would they put through laws granting leave singularly to pregnant workers,
,,
with a guaranteed right to return to the job? 23o Or, she mused, would they
shelter others within the ambit of legislation giving both women and men time
,
to care for "a seriously ill child, spouse, elderly parent or self? ,23I She
232
concluded that such legislation was not an impossible dream. California has
partially enacted that dream, with the bigger dream of job-protected, paid leave
still in the legislative hopper. Future movements will likely be evaluated by
226. See Phoebe A. Haddon, Coalescing With SALT: A Taste for Inclusion, I I S. CAL. REv. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 32 1 , 3 2 1 -22 (2002).
227. See Paid Family Leave, http://www.paidfamilyleave.org (last visited March 1 0, 2009).
228. Telephone Interviews with Sharon Terman, Staff Attorney, LAS-ELC, Patricia A. Shiu,
Assembly Member Fiona Ma legislative staff, Nick Hardeman, and Greg Asay who was involved in
drafting the San Francisco Paid Sick Days Ordinance (Jan. 27 & 29, 2008).
229. Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought
ofthe 1970s, 1 989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 1 8 (1989).
230. ld.
23 1 . Id.
232. Id.
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benchmarks like those of the California movement such as inclusiveness,
outreach, effectiveness of coalition, and worker benefits gained. Vision and
hope lie at the foundation for any workers' rights movement. Hope, tempered
by a healthy dose of reality, remains the underpinning for any movement for
change.233

233. See generally BARACK OSAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE
AMERICAN DREAM (2006) (discussing new strategies to address issues and future directions for the
United States, emphasizing the value of hope).
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